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ABSTRACT
Although cognitive theories suggest that attentional bias to illness
stimuli and inflation of subjective risk of future negative health
events are etiologically related to hypochondriacal concern, little
eirpirical research has been conducted on these cognitive distortions.
The present study investigated attentional bias, as inferred from RTs
on an attentional search information processing paradigm, and
subjective risk, as measured by probability judgments of future
health events, in 200 medical outpatients differing in level of
hypochondriacal concern.

It was hypothesized that hypochondriacal

concern would be associated with specific cognitive biases for
illness-related, as opposed to socially threatening, stimuli.

It was

also hypothesized that dysphoric mood would interact with the
cognitive distortions in the prediction of hypochondriacal concern.
An exploratory path analysis also tested the proposed causal
contributions of objective health status, minor life events,
depressed mood, attentional bias, and subjective risk in the
production of hypochondriacal concern.

The results indicated,

however, that attentional bias to socially threatening stimuli
accounted for more variance in hypochondriacal concern than illness
cues.

Also unexpected was the finding that subjects tended to rate

future positive health events as more likely to occur than negative
health events as hypochondriacal concern increased in the sample.
Although the results generally failed to support the hypothesis that
illness-specific cognitive distortions are related to hypochondriacal
vii

concern, several factors which may have contributed to the negative
findings were identified.

Further investigations of cognitive

distortions in individuals diagnosed with DSM-III-R hypochondriasis
appears warranted.
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INTRODUCTION
Hypochondriasis is one of the most poorly understood and
inadequately researched phenomena in psychology (Turner, Jacob, &
Morrison, 1984).

Much of what has been written about hypochondriasis

has been based upon clinical observations or assumptions, rather than
on experimental evidence.

Various theories have invoked factors

ranging from unconscious, intrapsychic conflicts (Hyler & Sussman,
1984) to heightened perceptual sensitivity (Hanback & Revelle, 1978).
Recently, however, cognitive theories have been proposed to account
for the origin and maintenance of hypochondriacal concern (e.g.,
Barsky & Klerman, 1983; Warwick, 1989; Warwick & Salkovskis, 1990).
Such approaches would seem well suited to explaining hypochondriasis,
the primary diagnostic features of which include preoccupations,
false beliefs, irrational fears and misinterpretations.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of cognitive
factors in the etiology of hypochondriasis.

A historical review,

clinical description, prevalence rates, and sociodemographic factors
of hypochondriasis will be presented first.

The assessment

techniques utilized with hypochondriasis will also be explored.
Following this will be a review of the major etiological theories of
hypochondriasis and a rationale for the investigation of cognitive
factors in hypochondriasis. Information will then be presented
regarding cognitive factors in emotional disorders and their
assessment with objective, information processing strategies.

At the

conclusion of this paper, a study examining attentional bias and
subjective risk in individuals differing in levels of hypochondriacal

concern is presented.

The study also addresses the interaction of

stressful life events and mood with hypochondriacal concern, as well
as the specificity of cognitive distortions as they relate to
physically threatening information.

The results of the study, as

well as implications for future research, are discussed.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Historical Views of Hypochondriasis
The term "hypochondriasis" was coined by Galen in the 2nd
century A.D. to describe a form of melancholia and is derived from
Greek words which refer to the upper abdominal area (Turner, Jacob, &
Morrison, 1984).

Later in the 17t.h and 18th centuries, the word was

applied to suspected organic pathology of the "hypochondriacal
organs", such as the stomach, liver, and spleen (Hyler & Sussman,
1984).

Over time, hypochondriasis was increasingly used as a

fashionable explanation for a variety of ills.

Hypochondriasis

gradually became associated with hysteria, with the former term being
applied mostly to men, while the later was diagnosed more frequently
in women (Turner et al., 1984).

With continued indiscriminate

diagnostic usage, it was eventually abandoned as a disease concept
and was increasingly used by clinicians as a pejorative label for
difficult patients (Turner et al., 1984).

During the late 19th

century, the term evolved into its present usage as a description of
a psychiatric condition characterized by a fear of and preoccupation
with imagined disease (Kenyon, 1976).
Around the turn of the century, Freud introduced his formulation
of hypochondriacal neurosis.

He postulated that hypochondriasis was

a drive derivative produced by a disturbance of libido discharge
(Hyler & Sussman, 1984).

Later psychoanalytic theories

conceptualized hypochondriasis as transformed aggression (e.g., Brown
& Valliant, 1981) and also as a defense mechanism (e.g., McCranie,
1979).

According to Hyler and Sussman (1984), the most popular

psychodynamic formulation of the disorder suggests that
hypochondriasis develops in order to fulfill unmet dependency needs.
In their review, Barsky and Klerman (1983) concluded that the various
psychodynamic conceptualizations of hypochondriasis are based on
impressionistic, anecdotal, and uncontrolled evidence.
Clinical Description and Diagnosis of Hypochondriasis
Hypochondriasis was not even listed in the first diagnostic
manual of the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 1952) but
appeared in the second manual (APA, 1968) as a form of neurosis
(Turner et al., 1984).

The diagnostic criteria for the disorder,

however, were vague and heavily influenced by Freudian concepts.

A

major change occurred in the third edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; APA, 1980) when
hypochondriasis was listed as an independent, syndrome categorized
with the newly formed section of somatoform disorders.
Current diagnostic criteria for hypochondriasis in the revised
third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (APA, 1987) include:
1) preoccupation with the fear of having, or the belief that
one has, a serious disease, based on the person's interpretation
of physical signs or sensations as evidence of physical illness;
2) appropriate physical evaluation does not support the
diagnosis of any physical signs or sensations or the person's
unwarranted interpretation of them, and the symptoms ... are not
just symptoms of panic attacks; and 3) the fear of having, or
belief that one has, a disease persists despite medical
reassurance; ... but 4) the belief is not of delusional
intensity, (p. 261)

Associated features include strained doctor-patient relationships and
"doctor-shopping".

A duration of at least six months is required for

the diagnosis (APA, 1987).
Diagnostic Validity of Hypochondriasis
In spite of its adoption into the diagnostic nomenclature,
debate has continued over whether hypochondriasis is a discrete
diagnostic entity or a symptom (Barsky & Klerman, 1983).

After

reviewing the literature and case records of 512 patients given a
chart diagnosis of hypochondriasis, Kenyon (1964) concluded that
hypochondriasis does not exist as a primary state.

Critics of the

DSM classification system (e.g., Barsky & Klerman, 1983) point out
that the somatization of hypochondriasis (i.e., the expression of
emotional discomfort and psychosocial stress in the physical language
of bodily symptoms) can occur secondary to other conditions, such as
anxiety disorders and schizophrenia.
For example, several authors (e.g., Brink, 1982; DeAlcaron,
1964) have reported that hypochondriasis is most likely to occur as a
result of depression in the elderly, noting the frequent clinical
reports of hypochondriacal concern in aged medical patients.

In

their review of the literature, however, Costa and McCrae (1985)
noted that reports of increased hypochondriacal concern in the elderly
are confounded by real health changes with age.

They concluded that

the stereotype of the elderly hypochondriac is unfounded.

More

recently, hypochondriasis has been implicated as an associated
feature in panic disorder (Noyes, Reich, Clancy, & O'Gorman, 1986)
and agoraphobia (Fava, Kellner, Zielezny, & Grandi, 1988).
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Uncontrolled studies by these research groups suggest that when the
underlying "true" disorder (e.g., panic) was treated, the
hypochondriacal attitudes diminished even though these concerns were
not specifically targeted by treatment.
Other authors, however, feel that hypochondriasis in its primary
form is a valid diagnostic category.

For example, Kellner and his

associates (1987) compared attitudes of DSM-III diagnosed
hypochondriacs to matched family practice patients, nonpatient
employees, and non-hypochondriacal psychiatric patients.

Results

supported the existence of a discrete syndrome, consistent with the
DSM-III conceptualization of hypochondriasis.

Barsky, Wyshak, and

Klerman (1986) report considerable consistency and internal validity
for the diagnosis of hypochondriasis.

Appleby (1987) argues that

viewing hypochondriacal symptoms as "masks" of other psychiatric
disorders ignores evidence that supports the validity of this
diagnostic entity.

Moreover, clinical anecdotes and uncontrolled

studies suggest that a substantial proportion of these patients
recover or improve with techniques that specifically target primary
hypochondriacal concerns and behaviors (Kellner, 1986).
Salkovskis and Warwick (1986) suggest that hypochondriacal
concerns run along a continuum from the mild transient concerns over
unusual bodily sensations to the excessive preoccupation found in
some individuals whose thought and activity are centered around
illness.

Therefore, hypochondriasis may exist as a valid diagnostic

entity in cases of extreme hypochondriacal concern.

In addition,

hypochondriacal concerns of varying degrees may appear in

individuals with other psychiatric diagnoses, as well as in the
normal public.

For example, mild, transient hypochondriacal concerns

are often found in beginning medical students, patients recovering
from acute and life-threatening illness, and individuals who have
recently lost a family member to a disease (Barsky & Klerman, 1983).
Prevalence and Sociodemographic Variables Associated with
Hypochondriasis
As Kellner (1985) notes, functional somatic symptoms are
ubiquitous in the general population.

About 60-80% of the public

will experience at least one somatic symptom in any one week
(Pennebaker, 1982).

Various reports suggest that between 20 and 84%

of medical outpatients complain of somatic symptoms for which no
organic cause can be found (Kellner, 1986).

Excessive symptom

reporting and overutilization of medical services may reflect either
hypochondriacal concerns, or one of a number of other poorly
understood conditions, such as somatization and conversion disorder
(Warwick, 1989).

It has been estimated that patients with excessive

health anxiety are responsible for 50% of the cost of adult
ambulatory general health care (Barsky & Klerman, 1983).
A methodologically adequate diagnostic survey of the prevalence
of hypochondriasis in a representative sample of the general
population has yet to be conducted (Kellner, 1986).

Examination of

the reported prevalence of the diagnosis of hypochondriasis among
psychiatric patients, however, has yielded estimates ranging from 0
to 12.5 percent (Kellner, 1986).

In the most rigorously derived

study published to date (Barsky, Wyshak, Klerman, & Latham, 1990),

the six-month prevalence rate of DSM-III-R diagnosed hypochondriasis
among medical outpatients was estimated to be between 4.2% and 6.3%
of consecutive attenders at a general medical clinic.
One of the biggest controversies in hypochondriasis research has
centered on age distribution of the disorder.

While several early

studies (e.g., Brink, 1982) suggested that hypochondriasis is
primarily a disorder of the elderly, Costa and McCrae (1985)
concluded in their review that hypochondriacal complaints are stable
across the age span.

Similarly, Kellner (1986) suggests that with

the possible exception of the depressed elderly, findings on the
relation between hypochondriasis and age are inconclusive.
Reports of the gender distribution of hypochondriasis also lack
consensus.

Although the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) states that the

disorder is equally common in both sexes, clinical lore suggests that
hypochondriasis is diagnosed more frequently in women than in men
(Hyler & Sussman, 1984).

Some studies (e.g., Kenyon, 1976),however,

have actually found the disorder to be more prevalent in males.

No

significant differences emerge between the sexes in the prevalence of
self-reported hypochondriacal concerns in normal subjects (Kellner,
1986).

In the previously cited study of prevalence rates in medical

outpatients (Barsky et al., 1990), female hypochondriacs outnumbered
their male counterparts by 3:1, but the ratio did not differ
significantly from that of the clinic population as a whole.
Furthermore, no sex differences were found in reported
hypochondriacal symptomatology. When compared to a control group,
the hypochondriacal patients did not differ significantly in any

sociodemographic risk factors except that they were significantly
more likely to be black.

This finding supports numerous cross-

cultural studies which suggests wide variations in specific
hypochondriacal complaints and attitudes across ethnic groups and
countries (Barsky & Klerman, 1983; Turner et al., 1984).
Assessment of Hypochondriasis
The assessment of hypochondriasis has relied mainly on the use
of questionnaires.

The Illness Attitude Scales (Kellner, 1986) and

the Whitely Index (Pilowsky, 1967) are self-report instruments that
focus on hypochondriacal attitudes and beliefs rather than on reports
of somatic symptoms.

Principal components analysis or factor

analysis of such measures typically yield multiple factors such as
disease phobia, disease conviction, and bodily preoccupations
(Kellner, 1986).

Such questionnaires have demonstrated adequate

reliability and validity, and are effective in discriminating between
psychiatric patients diagnosed as hypochondriacal and those who are
not (Barsky & Wyshak, 1989).

Kellner (1986) cautions, however, that

the use of such scales can yield misleading results in patients who
have a serious physical disease.
The Hs clinical scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (McKinley & Hathaway, 1940) was originally developed to
identify individuals who manifest a pattern of symptoms associated
with the label of hypochondriasis (Graham, 1987).

Although the 33-

items in the scale assess vague somatic complaints, it is not a pure
measure of hypochondriasis (Kellner, 1986).

Patients with organic

diseases, other somatoform disorders, anxiety, and depression also
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tend to score high on the scale (Graham, 1987).

Several other

inventories exist which measure self-reported somatic symptoms (e.g.,
Wahler Physical Symptoms Inventory; Wahler, 1983) or abnormal illness
behavior (e.g., Illness Behavior Inventory; Turkat & Pettegrew,
1983 ).

Although these measures appear to be correlated with

hypochondriacal attitudes, they do not directly assess the purported
cognitive distortions of hypochondriacal beliefs and attitudes which
constitute the disorder's primary diagnostic criteria.
Questionnaires which rely upon self-reports of physical symptoms
or illness behavior are confounded with the behavioral and somatic
effects of organic illness, and add little to the understanding of
hypochondriasis (Mabe, Hobson, Jones, & Jarvis, 1988).

Such measures

would be unlikely to effectively discriminate between hypochondriasis
and other somatoform disorders or organic disease.

Therefore, self-

reports of physical symptoms or illness behavior provide only half of
the story of hypochondriasis (Costa & McCrae, 1985).

According to

Mabe and his associates (1988), studies of hypochondriasis in medical
populations have generally been flawed because of insufficient
attention to objective health status.

Costa and McCrae (1985)

concur, arguing that the diagnosis of hypochondriasis depends upon
the discrepancy between subjective and objective health.

Excessive

symptom complaints or overutilization of medical services cannot be
equated with hypochondriasis in the absence of objective medical
information (Zonderman, Heft, & Costa, 1985).
Two of the most methodologically adequate studies of
hypochondriasis published to date have included objective ratings of

patient health status.

In a study of medical inpatients, a composite

index of hypochondriacal traits was created from the Whitely Index
(Pilowsky, 1967), the discrepancy between the subject's and
physician's ratings of the severity of subject's illness, and the
physician's ratings of the extent to which the presentation of the
subject's illness was disproportionate to demonstrable disease (Mabe
et al., 1988).

Correlations between the Discrepancy Score, Physician

Ratings, and the Whitely Index, however, were insignificant.

The

physician ratings were based upon a single interview; ratings
supplemented with a chart review could possibly have increased
reliability.

In a study of general medical outpatients, Barsky,

Wyshak, and Klerman (1986) conducted an audit of medical records and
diagnoses were judged by predetermined criteria as to the severity of
illness.

The number of major and minor medical diagnoses were not

correlated with self-reported hypochondriacal attitudes in
hypochondriacal patients.

Strategies such as these which rule out

severe organic illness and provide objective evidence of the
discrepancy between patients' fears and disease status may provide
the most valid assessment of hypochondriasis (Mabe et al., 1988).
Contemporary Etiological Theories of Hypochondriasis
In the 50s and 60s, Parsons (1951 ) and Mechanic and Volkart
(1960, 1961) revolutionized the way illness and somatization could be
conceptualized with the introduction of such concepts as illness
behavior, the sick role, and symptom reporting.

Pilowsky (1967)

applied these ideas to hypochondriacs and reframed them as abnormal
illness behaviors, noting the discrepancy between the nature and
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degree of hypochondriacs1 claim to the sick role and their lack of
organic pathology.

This formulation of hypochondriasis suggested

that social learning factors such as parental modeling and
reinforcement of illness behaviors were primary etiological agents
(Mechanic, 1972).

This conceptualization provided an objective

description of the syndrome that was more empirically-based than
psychodynamic models.

While popular, this model raised as many

questions as it answered and prompted a search for important
moderating variables within illness behavior.
Physiological disturbance is another factor that has been
explored in hypochondriasis.

Nemiah (1977) has proposed that

hypochondriacal and psychosomatic patients may suffer from
alexithymia, a neurophysiological inability to experience emotion,
but no such deficit has been experimentally confirmed (Warwick &
Salkovskis, 1990).

A wide body of research does suggest, however,

that individual differences exist in the visceral or perceptual
experience of kinesthetic, visual, auditory, somatosensory, and pain
stimuli (Barsky, Wyshak, & Klerman, 1990).

Therefore, some

researchers have proposed psychophysiological explanations for
hypochondriasis, suggesting that heightened perceptual sensitivity or
reduced pain thresholds are responsible for the disorder (Kellner,
1986).
The few empirical studies conducted with hypochondriacal
subjects are supportive of this theory.

For example, patients with

disease conviction and disease phobia have been found to have lower
thresholds for and tolerance to experimental pain (Bianchi, 1971;

Merskey & Evans, 1975).

Similarly, Petrie (1978) has documented that

hypochondriacal normals exhibit a lower tolerance for experimental
pain, as well as kinesthetic amplification (i.e., overestimation of
the size of objects held in hands while blindfolded).

Hanback and

Revelle (1978) demonstrated that hypochondriacal normals are more
visually sensitive to dual flicker fusion of light.

Several studies

also suggest that hypochondriacs are more sensitive to or reactive to
normal physiological sensations (Barsky & Wyshak, 1990).

For

example, hypochondriacal out-patients were more accurate in
estimations of cardiac function than phobic patients (Tyrer, Lee, &
Alexander, 1980).

Wright, Kane, Olsen, and Smith (1977) found that

hypochondriacal subjects report respiratory symptoms disproportionate
to the results of pulmonary function tests.
In this conceptualization of hypochondriasis, the clinical
characteristics of bodily preoccupation, disease conviction, and
doctor-shopping are caused by heightened perceptual sensitivity.
Equally plausible is that increased attention to bodily sensations
heightens perceptual sensitivity (Barsky & Klerman, 1983; Pennebaker,
1982).

While the studies cited above are suggestive, they are

ultimately flawed because subjects in each of the experiments were
aware of the experimental condition, or were asked to focus their
attention upon physical sensations.

The proof that hypochondriasis

is caused by heightened perceptual sensitivity can only be provided
by an experiment in which internal sensations are directly
manipulated without subjects' knowledge.

None exist in the
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literature, reflecting the methodological and ethical difficulties
that would be involved in such an experiment.
Barsky and Klerman (1983) suggest that the key feature of the
disorder involves the abnormal amplification or augmentation of
normal bodily sensations by selective attention to or the
misinterpretation of innocuous physical sensations.

For example, the

symptoms so frequently complained about by hypochondriacs are those
that commonly occur with stress (Kenyon, 1964; Mechanic, 1972) and/or
have a very high prevalence in the general population (Kellner,
1986).

Factors that may be involved in the amplification of normal

bodily symptoms include anxiety (Barsky & Klerman, 1983),
conditioning, or social learning (Kellner, 1986).

Pennebaker (1982)

has also demonstrated that simply directing a person's attention to
bodily sensations increases reports of physical symptoms.

Selective

attention to the "internal", physical environment may thus augment or
amplify bodily sensations and produce hypochondriacal concerns
(Barsky & Klerman, 1983).

Pennebaker (1982) also suggests that

hypochondriacs also search for and attend to illness-related stimuli
in the external environment (e.g., health columns in the newspapers).
Barsky and Klerman (1983) have therefore concluded that
hypochondriasis is best conceptualized as a cognitive abnormality in
that patients: 1 ) incorrectly assess and misat.tribute the somatic
symptoms of emotional arousal and of normal bodily function and 2)
consistently think and perceive in physical and concrete terms rather
in emotional and subjective terms.

Warwick (1989) has elaborated

upon this idea in a cognitive-behavioral theory of hypochondriasis.
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She proposes the initial stage of the disorder is characterized by
the perception of an intrusive, health-related stimulus such as a
physical sensation.

The stimulus may be erroneously appraised as

threatening if the individual holds inaccurate health beliefs or has
past personal experience of medical mismanagement.

Negative thoughts

and images of a threat to health will be associated with anxiety,
which in turn may be associated with increased physiological arousal
and attentional focus on bodily sensations.

These may then be

interpreted by the patient as further evidence of illness.

A range

of avoidant behaviors, bodily checking, and reassurance seeking may
serve as maintaining factors until a vicious circle is established,
resulting in preoccupation with physical symptoms and health
(Warwick, 1989).
Stress and Hypochondriasis
While stress has been implicated in symptom-reporting among
normals (e.g., Banks & Gannon, 1988), theory and research suggest
that there is a special interaction between emotional distress and
abnormal illness fears.

Psychodynamic theories and clinical lore

suggests that these patients repress or deny emotional distress
(Hyler & Sussman, 1984).

Cognitive-behavioral theories suggest that

hypochondriacs misinterpret the somatic manifestations of emotional
arousal or stress as signs of illness (e.g., Barsky & Klerman, 1983).
Research has documented the adoption of the sick role (e.g., Mechanic
& Volkart, 1961), and the overutilization of medical services in
somatizers (e.g., Miranda, Perez-Stable, Munoz, Hargreaves, & Henke,
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1991) under stress.

Thus, both clinical lore and research suggest

that hypochondriacal concerns intensify during periods of stress.
Seminal formulations of stress in the social sciences (e.g.,
Holmes & Rahe, 1967) attempted to quantify major life events such as
divorce or job change.

Although stress is presumed to be a factor in

symptom complaints and the initiation and maintenance of illness, the
relation has often been obscured by difficulties in temporally
linking major life events to the onset and expression of symptoms
(Brantley & Jones, 1989).

More recently, the concept of stress has

been expanded to include minor stress or "hassles" (Brantley,
Waggoner, Jones, & Rappaport, 1987; DeLongis, Coyne, Dakof, Folkman,
& Lazarus, 1982; Kanner, Coyne, Schaeffer, & Lazarus, 1981).
Examples of minor stress include such things as being interrupted
while relaxing or being late to an appointment.

The temporal

relation to physical symptoms is more easily ascertained for recent,
minor stressors than for global, retrospectively recalled major life
events.

More importantly, however, minor stress appears to account

for more of the variance in symptom-reporting than major life events
(e.g., Brantley & Jones, 1989) and contributes information
independently of what can be attributed to major life events in the
stress-illness relation (DeLongis et al., 1982).
Research suggests that two important factors, the global number
of stressors and the perceived impact of the stressors (Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984), contribute to the stress response.

Although theories

and clinical lore imply that hypochondriacs repress or deny emotion
and experience stress somatically, little research has been conducted
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which examines their patterns of endorsement of these two aspects of
minor life events.

Somatizers, for example, may endorse frequency

levels of minor stressors similar to normals, but rate their impact
as being relatively more negative.
Support for a Cognitive Theory of Hypochondriasis
Interest in the relation between emotion and cognition has
dramatically increased over the last decade.

Cognitive distortions

have been hypothesized to either directly contribute to or act as a
moderating variable in the etiology and maintenance of disorders such
as anxiety and depression.

In addition, cognitive-based treatments

have formed the basis of successful interventions for emotional
disturbances (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).

Since

cognitive approaches have been successful with what have been
traditionally termed as disorders of mood, such an approach would
seem especially suited to a disorder like hypochondriasis, whose
primary diagnostic features emphasize cognitive excesses and
distortions such as preoccupations, false beliefs, irrational fears,
and misinterpretations.

Indeed, the most widely used interventions

for hypochondriasis recommend the use of either "common-sense" based
reassurances to allay irrational fears, or cognitive/cognitivebehavioral strategies to more vigorously attack distorted beliefs
(e.g., Barsky, Geringer, & Wool, 1988; Kellner, 1986).
Several investigators have used questionnaires (e.g., Kellner &
Schneider-Braus, 1988) and factor analysis (e.g., Pilowsky, 1967;
Bianchi, 1973) to examine the beliefs and attitudes of
hypochondriacal subjects and compare their responses to other
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clinical populations and normals.

The results of these studies

suggest that hypochondriacs think about and perceive illness
differently from other people.

For example, Kellner and his

associates (1987) found that hypochondriacal patients report more
fears of and false beliefs about disease, greater attention to bodily
sensations, more fears about death, and greater utilization of
medical care than general medical patients or normal controls.

Their

hypochondriacal subjects also reported greater distrust of their
physicians and more health-risk behaviors.

Barsky and Wyshak (1989)

have documented that hypochondriasis is positively related to several
health-related attitudes and concerns, such as amplification of
bodily sensations, fears of aging and death, and a sense of bodily
vulnerability.
While supportive of cognitive theories of hypochondriasis,
questionnaire studies such as these provide only a descriptive
account of self-reported beliefs and attitudes.

It remains unclear

whether the purported interpretive and attentional biases in
hypochondriasis actually exist (Hitchcock & Mathews, 1992).

As has

been extensively argued elsewhere (e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, &
Mathews, 1988), self-reported differences in beliefs and attitudes
cannot be taken as unequivocal evidence of the underlying cognitive
processes.

Such reports may reflect demand effects, or "common-

sense" theories developed in retrospect to explain behavior or
feelings.

Subjects may in fact have very limited access to, or

direct knowledge of, attentional and interpretive processes as they
occur, especially if they are overlearned and automatic in nature,
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rather than intentional and consciously controlled (Williams et al.,
1988).
Furthermore, cognitive theories of hypochondriasis (Barsky &
Klerman, 1983; Warwick, 1989) imply that hypochondriacs have
specific attentional and interpretive biases toward physicallythreatening information only.

Questionnaire studies of

hypochondriasis have typically failed to assess self-reported
cognitive distortions in other domains, such as social threat.
Complete understanding of this disorder may require the assessment of
cognitive factors using objective, information processing tasks, and
comparisons of the processing of illness related-cues to threatening
information from other domains.
In the only study to date to employ objective assessment of
cognitive distortions in hypochondriasis, Hitchcock and Mathews
(1992) examined the interpretation of ambiguous bodily sensations in
three experiments using separate samples of nonclinical subjects
differing in level of hypochondriacal concern.

In the first task,

subjects directly reported their thoughts and interpretations about
ambiguous bodily symptoms.

The results suggested clear evidence of

interpretive bias in the expected direction, in which subjects with
high levels of hypochondriacal concern reported more catastrophic
illness interpretations of ambiguous bodily sensations than subjects
with low levels of hypochondriacal concern.

The presence of an

interpretive bias found further, conditional support in a task
designed to be less demand-prone and transparent than self-report.
Although individuals with high levels of hypochondriacal concern were
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found to endorse significantly more threatening versions of
previously heard ambiguous sentences than subjects with lower levels
of hypochondriacal concerns, the high hypochondriacal subjects were
equally likely to endorse physically and socially threatening
versions.
In the final task, subjects were presented with sentences, some
of which implied social or illness threats, and then asked to make a
speeded decision about whether a word describing the inference had
appeared in the sentence.

The results from this task failed to

support the hypothesis of an automatic inference bias.

Overall, the

results of these three studies (Hitchcock & Mathews, 1992) confirmed
the existence of an interpretive bias toward threatening information,
but cast doubt on the idea that this bias is always specific to
illness cues, or that the interpretive process is completely
automatic.

Interestingly, the third study did indicate that subjects

with high hypochondriacal concern were quicker to identify previously
exposed illness words, suggesting a specific, enhanced sensitivity to
illness-related information in hypochondriasis.

Thus, it may be that

selective attention to illness cues plays a role in the initiation or
maintenance of hypochondriacal concern with bodily symptoms.
Attentional Bias
Selective attention, the differential processing of simultaneous
sources of information, is the natural consequence of capacity
limitations within the cognitive system (Williams et al., 1988).
number of studies suggest that this process may be biased in
emotional disorders such that clinically anxious individuals

A

selectively attend to threatening information (e.g., Mathews &
MacLeod, 1985).

Increased perceptual salience for such material has

been found to differentially affect the performance of clinically
anxious patients, as compared to normals, on a variety of
information-processing tasks (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986).

For

example, the incidental presence of threatening stimuli has been
found to influence the direction of attentional responses and to
interfere with performance on ongoing tasks in anxious individuals
(Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 1990).

While clinically

anxious subjects appear to consistently shift attention toward
threatening stimuli, non-anxious normals appear to shift attention
away from such material (Williams et al., 1988).
Several lines of research suggest that a strong association
exists between internally-focused attention and increased symptom
reporting (for a review, see Cioffi, 1991).

These include studies of

self-awareness (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981), deficits in the
external environment (e.g., Pennebaker, 1982), and pain distraction
(e.g., Mullen & Suls, 1982).

A hypochondriacal response is presumed

by many (e.g., Barsky & Klerman, 1983) to reflect the selective
deployment of attention to internal, physical sensations, as well as
to illness-relevant cues in the external world, such as media reports
of specific diseases.

As noted previously, Hitchcock and Mathews

(1992) have found evidence of increased salience for illness-related
information in individuals with high hypochondriacal concern.

This

finding suggests the possibility that hypochondriacal subjects show
an attentional bias similar to that found in anxiety patients, but
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which is more specifically focused on illness cues.

If so, then such

an attentional focus could arise because of fears of illness, but
could also enhance the perception and interpretation of symptoms,
thus causing an increase in fear.
Bower's (1981) network model suggests that selective attention
may be biased toward the encoding of mood-congruent material and that
this bias should lead to increased perceptual salience for such
material.

Selective attention to threat cues in trait-anxious

individuals appears to increase during manipulations of state anxiety
or experimentally-induced stress (Williams et al., 1988).

Broadbent

and Broadbent (1988) suggest that this interaction between trait and
state anxiety is a reliable effect.

A similar interaction may occur

in hypochondriacal patients such that attentional bias to illnessrelated threat cues may be potentiated during times of stress or
dysphoric mood.
Experimental Methods. Several different information processing
paradigms have been adapted for investigations of attentional bias in
emotional disorders.

The three most frequently used involve

variations of the Stroop color-naming task (Stroop, 1935), the dot
probe (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tat.a, 1986), and the attentional search
task (Broadbent, Broadbent, & Jones, 1986).

As utilized for

investigations of attentional bias in anxiety, the Stroop colornaming task presents threatening and neutral words in varying colors
and asks subjects to name the ink color of the words as quickly as
possible while ignoring the meaning of the words.

Slower color-

naming in the presence of threatening, as opposed to neutral, words
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suggests an attentional bias to threatening stimuli.

In the dot

probe experiment, word pairs are presented on a computer screen.

The

subjects' task is to read aloud the upper word in each pair and press
a response key any time a small dot replaces one of the two words.
Faster detection of the dot probe if it replaces a threatening word,
as opposed to a non-threatening word, indicates attentional bias to
threatening stimuli.

The attentional search paradigm requires

subjects to identify a neutral word target in the presence of two
distractor words.

Slower reaction times in the presence of threat

distractors, as opposed to neutral distractors, suggests attentional
bias to threatening stimuli.
Validity and Reliability of Experimental Methods. According to
a recent review by Logan and Goetsch (1993), evidence of retest
reliability has only been reported for the different Stroop methods.
These reviewers also concluded that while discriminant validity has
been demonstrated for all the experimental methods, construct
validity has not.

Basic questions have been raised over which of the

experimental paradigms provide the most valid test of attentional
bias.

For example, the original Stroop test has been criticized as a

poor test of selective attention (e.g., Treisman, 1969) because it
presents targets (colors of words) and distracting stimuli (words) in
identical areas of the visual field.

Critics such as Fox (1993)

argue that appropriate tests for selective attention require the tobe-attended and distracting information be presented in spatially
separate locations (e.g., Fox, 1993).

The dot probe and attentional

search tasks meet this criteria and have demonstrated reliable
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attentional biases in groups differing in their level of anxiety
(Fox, 1992; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mathews, May, Mogg, and Eysenck,
1990).
Although Mathews (1990) believes that only the dot probe
paradigm directly measures attentional capture, Fox (1993) has argued
that subjects can circumvent this attentional task with appropriate
strategies.

She suggests that modified Stroop tasks (e.g., those

which employ masking) and the attentional search paradigm are better
tests of the capacity to ignore distraction which appears outside the
focus of attention.

According to Mathews (1990), however,

attentional bias can only be inferred from slower reaction times to
distracting stimuli in the attentional search task.

For example, a

heightened negative affect due to exposure to threatening words
rather than an attentional bias to threatening information may
explain the performance interference in the attentional search task.
While alternative explanations such as this cannot be completely
ruled out, similarities between the results of the different
attentional paradigms argue that the most parsimonious conclusion is
that the interference effect is a function of attentional bias
(Mathews, 1990).
It is important to note that information processing paradigms of
selective attention have yet to establish at what point in the
cognitive system selective biases are occurring (Fox, 1993).

It may

be that attentional selection processes only "early" or low-level
perceptual features of stimuli, rather than "late" semantic meaning.
Although recent evidence of interference from to-be-ignored stimuli
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favors late over early selection accounts, subtle discrepancies in
the basic cognitive literature have led some to propose hybrid models
involving a flexible locus for visual selection (Yantis & Johnson,
1990).

Debate will surely continue until this issue is resolved

conclusively by empirical evidence.

It is unlikely, however, that

repetition priming of low-level perceptual features can account for
the findings, because reliable attentional biases have been shown for
anxious individuals under conditions where stimulus words are
presented only once, as well as conditions in which word stimuli are
repeated (Fox, 1993).
Specificity of Threat. Attentional specificity to threatening
stimuli has been demonstrated across a number of anxiety-prone
populations.

Populations as diverse as subjects with PTSD (McNally,

Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990), spider phobia (Watts, McKenna,
Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986), and social phobia (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg,
& Dombeck, 1990) have displayed interference effects specific to
their areas of clinical concern.

Furthermore, specificity to

physically threatening stimuli has been demonstrated in a number of
clinically anxious subjects, including those with panic disorder
(Ehlers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988; McNally, Riemann, & Kim) and
generalized anxiety disorder patients who reported worrying more
about illness than social concerns (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg,
Mathews, & Weinman, 1989).

Therefore, it is plausible to suggest

that a disorder such as hypochondriasis, which is characterized by
preoccupation with, and fear of, illness would be associated with a
similar attentional interference effect to illness-related stimuli.

Relation to Perceived Risk. It is at least possible that
enhanced sensitivity to illness-related information, however
acquired, functions as a maintaining or exacerbating factor in
hypochondriacal anxiety (Hitchcock & Mathews, 1992).

If attention is

repeatedly drawn to information relevant to illness, the availability
of that information in memory will be enhanced, and the perceived
risk of acquiring that disease increased (Lichtenstein, Slovic,
Fischoff, Layman & Combs, 1978).

If particular bodily symptoms are

believed to be typical of those associated with a feared disease,
these symptoms may also come to attract special attention, and then
be interpreted as confirming evidence of that disease via the
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982).

A

bias in judgments of self-related future negative events specific to
illness is consistent with clinical descriptions of hypochondriasis.
Inflation of subjective health risk may motivate the well known
hypochondriacal behaviors of doctor shopping, bodily checking and
reassurance seeking.
Subjective Risk
Although misinterpretation of ambiguous physical sensations has
received the most attention as the form of biased judgment
responsible for hypochondriasis, only conditional support has been
demonstrated for this cognitive distortion (Hitchcock & Mathews,
1992).

It may be that a different form of judgmental bias,

elevations of subjective health risk, may play a more central role in
the production and maintenance of hypochondriacal anxiety.
Subjective risk estimates involve probability judgments on the
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likelihood of the occurrence of future events (e.g., that a
Republican candidate will win the presidential election in 1996).
Such judgments appear to be based upon the availability heuristic, or
the ease with which examples of such events can be remembered or
imagined (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
Systematic biases in judgment can be demonstrated in individuals
when they make judgments concerning uncertain events, because
availability is sometimes poorly correlated with actual frequency or
probability (Rodin, 1978).

Probability judgments can be influenced

by manipulations of information salience (Kahneman et al., 1982).
Evidence exists that emotional disorders, manipulations of mood, or
experimentally-induced stress can also affect judgments of future
risks (Williams et al., 1988).

For example, Butler and Mathews

(1983) found that anxious and depressed subjects rate negative
events as more likely to happen than normal controls.

The finding

that subjective risk judgments are mood sensitive appears to be
reliable (e.g., Bower, 1983 ).
According to Rodin (1978), attributional biases and the
availability heuristic affect estimations of the likelihood of
becoming the victim of a disease.

The operation of health-related

subjective risk bias in hypochondriacs, however, has yet to be
investigated.

Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) have demonstrated that

probability estimates of future negative health-related events among
normals is moderated by health status (which may affect availability)
and mood.

Inflation of subjective health risk may therefore increase
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in hypochondriacs, especially in the presence of dysphoric mood or
stress.
A Model of Hypochondriasis
It thus appears that a causal model may be postulated in which
stress and depressed mood interact with the cognitive distortions of
attentional bias to illness-related cues, and inflation of future
negative health risk, to produce hypochondriacal concern.

It has

been argued, however, that important individual differences may
underlie this process.

Psychiatric patients, as opposed to normals,

may process such information with dysfunctional schemas when negative
mood states are activated (Teasdale, 1993).

In such a model, the

vulnerability underlying hypochondriacal concern would involve the
activation of distorted illness-schemas.

Thus, while stress or

depression may increase innocuous symptom-reporting in normals, this
process may be exaggerated in hypochondriacs and lead to abnormal
illness behaviors.
Thus, the occurrence of a stressor, whether illness-related
(e.g., illness of relative) or illness-irrelevant (e.g., argument
with family member), may activate a negative mood state and produce
changes in accessibility of congruent information.

In

hypochondriacal individuals, this may be distorted information about
illness schematically arranged in memory.

A health-related stimulus

(e.g., newspaper report of new disease) may also directly prime this
information.

A change in availability may lead to the recall of

mood-congruent memories, as well as selective allocation of attention
in scanning the environment for congruent information.

As argued
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earlier, if attention is repeatedly drawn to information relevant to
illness, then the availability of that information in memory will be
further enhanced, and the perceived risk of becoming ill will be
increased.

This inflation of negative health risk then results in

hypochondriacal concern.

Although an empirical relationship has yet

to be established between attentional bias and subjective risk,
availability mediated by an association network (Bower, 1981) has
been postulated as an underlying mechanism for both subjective risk
judgments and selective allocation of attentional resources (e.g.,
Williams et al., 1988).

The proposed model also allows the

possibility of a circular process by which hypochondriacal concerns
are maintained.

The hypochondriacal fears may in turn become

illness-relevant stressors themselves and lead to further priming of
distorted illness information and increases in dysphoric mood,
continuing the cycle.
Purpose of Study and Hypotheses
Although cognitive theories of hypochondriasis have generally
proposed that selective attention and misinterpretation of bodily
sensations are important etiological factors in hypochondriasis,
little empirical research has been conducted on these cognitive
distortions.

The present study investigated attentional bias, as

measured by an attentional search information processing paradigm,
and biased judgment, as measured by subjective risk estimates of
future events, in medical patients differing in levels of health
anxiety, or hypochondriacal concern.

Because the diagnosis of

hypochondriasis depends upon the discrepancy between subjective and
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objective health, level of hypochondriacal concern was controlled byphysician ratings of global health status.
As cognitive theories imply that hypochondriacs have specific
attentional and interpretive biases to illness-related information,
the content-specificity of the proposed cognitive distortions were
tested.

Therefore, threatening stimuli from another domain were

included in the attentional bias task and subjective risk estimates
to determine if purported cognitive biases in hypochondriasis are
specific to illness-related stimuli, or are only a manifestation of a
more general sensitivity to all potential threats.

Socially-

threatening words were chosen as the contrast category because
physical and social threat words are the most commonly contrasted
content domains in investigations of attentional bias in anxiety
(e.g., Fox, 1993; Hope et al., 1990; Mathews et al., 1990).

In

addition, because hypochondriacal concern has been linked in clinical
lore and empirical research to interpersonal or emotional distress,
it was thought that this contrast would provide the strongest test of
the content-specificity hypothesis.
Therefore, the present study examined the hypothesis that
hypochondriacal concerns are associated with a specific attentional
bias for illness-related, as opposed to socially threatening,
stimuli.

Similarly, the study also examined whether hypochondriacal

concerns were more strongly associated with an inflation of
subjective risk in judgments of future negative events concerning
health, as opposed to socially negative events.

Past research has

also indicated that experimentally-induced stress and dysphoric mood
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are associated with cognitive distortions in trait anxious
individuals.

In addition, clinical lore, theory, and research

suggest that hypochondriacal concern is associated with stress and
exacerbated by depressed mood.

Therefore, the present study tested

the prediction that depressed mood would interact with illnessrelated cognitive distortions to produce hypochondriacal concern.
The relation between hypochondriacal concern and minor life events
was also examined.
In summary, by investigating cognitive processes in individuals
differing in levels of hypochondriacal concern, the investigator
attempted to answer the following questions:
1.

Is self-reported hypochondriacal concern associated with

attentional bias to illness-related cues, as opposed to sociallythreatening cues?

It was hypothesized that attentional interference

from illness-related cues would predict significantly more variance in
hypochondriacal concern than attentional interference from sociallythreatening stimuli.
2.

Is self-reported hypochondriacal concern associated with

inflation of future subjective health risk?

Based upon cognitive

theories of hypochondriasis and studies of subjective risk, it was
hypothesized that judgments of future negative health events would
predict significantly more variance in hypochondriacal concern than
judgments of future negative social events.
3.

What is the relation among depression, cognitive distortions in

attentional bias and subjective risk, and hypochondriacal concerns?
It was also hypothesized that depressed mood would significantly

interact with attentional interference from illness-related cues in
the prediction of hypochondriacal concerns.

Similarly, it was

hypothesized that a significant interaction would be obtained between
depressed mood, and judgments of future health events in the
prediction of hypochondriacal concerns.
4.

What are the causal and directional influences of objective

health status, stressful minor life events, depression, attentional
bias to illness-related cues, and subjective risk of future health
events on hypochondriacal concerns?

An exploratory path analysis

tested the proposed causal contributions of objective health status,
minor life events, depressed mood, attentional bias, and subjective
risk in the production of hypochondriacal concern.

METHODS
Subjects
Subjects were 200 adult volunteers recruited from 2 general
medicine outpatient clinics at Earl K. Long Medical Center.

This

Southern hospital provides services for indigent patients, most of
whom are between 16-65 years of age.
patient population.

Females comprise 64.7% of the

A majority of patients are black (77.2%), while

21.5% are white and 1.3% are classified as "other".

Inclusion

criteria for the study were: if patients were between 21 and 65 years
of age, if they had been registered at the clinic for at least one
year, and if they granted access to their hospital medical records.
Subjects were excluded from participation if they were illiterate, if
they reported that they were unable to read the questionnaires (e.g.,
because of poor eyesight or because reading glasses were left at
home), or if they reported having a terminal illness (e.g., cancer).
Subjects having a physical disability which have would interfered
with their ability to use a computer keyboard with both hands were
also excluded from the study.
Measures
Demographic and Medical Status Questionnaire. This
questionnaire was created to collect basic demographic information
including age, gender, marital status, socioeconomic status, and
other demographic variables on all subjects (see Appendix A).

Three

questions also asked subjects if they had ever been diagnosed with a
life-threatening disease such as cancer, the reason for their
33
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appointment at the clinic (e.g., routine check-up, current illness),
and how long they had been enrolled at the clinic.
Physician Rating Scale. This rating scale was created to measure
objective health status.

It was adapted from procedures commonly

used to rate health in studies of hypochondriasis (e.g., Barsky et
al., 1986; Mabe et al., 1988).

Although physician ratings based on

this method provide some objective information pertaining to health
status, they are at best only a measure of aggregate medical
morbidity (Barsky et al., 1986).

The scale asks physicians to rate a

patient's global physical health using verbal anchors on a 7 point
Likert-type scale, ranging from '0 - patient is in good physical
health with a history of only routine minor illnesses' to '6 patient has a terminal illness, death is imminent1. Rating scales
such as this demonstrate adequate interrater reliability (e.g., Mabe
et al., 1988).

The rating scale is reproduced in its entirety in

Appendix B.
Illness Attitude Scales (IAS). All subjects were screened with
the Illness Attitude Scales (IAS: Kellner et al., 1987) to measure
hypochondriacal concern.

The IAS is a 29-item instrument designed to

measure attitudes, fears, and beliefs associated with
hypochondriasis.

Based upon the factor analytic work of Pilowsky

(1967) and Bianchi (1973), the IAS measures several commonly
recognized components of hypochondriasis, including worry about
illness, disease phobia, bodily preoccupation, and thanatophobia.
The items are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale and can be summed
to yield a composite score ranging from 0 to 116.

Kellner and his
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associates (1987) report a test-retest reliability of .87 for the
IAS.

This measure has been shown to differentiate between patients

with DSM-III diagnosed hypochondriasis and various other groups,
including normal controls, other psychiatric patients, and general
medical outpatients (Kellner et al., 1987).
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D).
The CES-D (Radloff, 1977) was used to measure depressed mood.

It is

a 20-item self-report inventory which assesses the number and
frequency of depressive symptoms experienced in the past week.

The

scale was designed to measure current level of depressive
symptomatology with emphasis on the affective component, depressed
mood (Rehm, 1988).

Because only a small proportion of CES-D items

address vegetative symptoms of depression, it is unlikely to be
confounded with symptoms of physical illness in a medical population.
The CES-D can be viewed as a measure of non-specific psychological
distress as it also seems to measure anxiety and self-esteem (Orme,
Reis, & Herz, 1986).

The instrument has very good psychometric

properties (Rehm, 1988) and extensive normative data are available
(Lewinsohn & Lee, 1981 ).

The CES-D has good internal consistency

with alphas of roughly .85 for the general population and .90 for
psychiatric populations.

Split-half and Spearman-Brown reliability

coefficients range from .77 to .92 (Radloff, 1977).
Weekly Stress Inventory (WSI). The WSI (Brantley & Jones, 1988)
was used to assess minor life events.

It is an 87-item self-report

scale which lists minor stressful events that a person might
experience throughout the week.

Each item is rated on an 8-point
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Likert-type scale, ranging from 0 ("did not happen") to 7 ("extremely
stressful").

The measure yields an Event score (WSI-E), which is the

total number of events endorsed, and an Impact score (WSI-I), which
gives the sum of subjective ratings of distress for the events.
Correlations of the WSI Event and Impact scores to their respective
counterparts on the Daily Stress Inventory (Brantley & Jones, 1989)
are .77 and .84 (Brantley & Jones, 1988).

Principal components

factor analysis of the WSI reveals one factor with an alpha
coefficient of .95, suggesting that the items consistently measure
the same construct of "stress".
Subjective Risk Questionnaire. This experimental instrument was
derived from that developed by Butler and Mathews (1987) to assess
subjective risk probabilities.

The items have high face validity and

directly ask subjects to make judgments concerning the probabilities
of future events.

The questionnaire does not purport to be a measure

of a stable trait, and the respondents' judgments themselves
constitute the data of interest.

Therefore, standard psychometric

measures of reliability are not usually reported for assessments of
subjective probabilities (e.g., Bower, 1983; Johnson & Tversky, 1983;
Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989).

However, judgments of subjective risk

have been demonstrated to change meaningfully with manipulations of
priming and mood state among normals and emotionally disturbed
individuals (Williams et al., 1988), consistent with theoretical
interpretations in terms of availability.
For the current study, subjects rated 30 items on a 9-point
scale in answer to the question "What is the probability that...?"
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All items employed the 2nd person (e.g., "you") to assess subjects'
personal probabilities.
half to negative events.

Half of the items referred to positive and
To test the central hypothesis on the

content specificity of cognitive distortions in individuals with
hypochondriacal concern, ten of the items referred to health-related
events, whereas ten other items referred to social-related events.
The remaining ten filler items referred to financial events.

The

type and valence of items were presented in balanced order. (See
Appendix C for the questionnaire.)
Attentional Bias Task
The attentional search task described by Mathews et al., (1990)
was used to assess attentional bias.

The task is supposed to measure

the extent to which subjects can avoid distraction during a visual
search.

During the task, subjects are required to identify the

target words "left" or "right" on a computer screen and to respond by
pressing the appropriate button as rapidly as possible.

For each

trial, three fixation crosses are displayed in a vertical column,
with the target replacing one of the crosses in any of the three
positions.

At the same time that the target is displayed, two

distractor words appear simultaneously and replace the two remaining
crosses in the vertical column.
Materials. Two categories of negative distractor words were
used to test the main hypotheses of the attentional bias experiment:
that hypochondriacal subjects would selectively attend to illnessrelated, as opposed to socially threatening words.

Two categories of

positive and neutral words were also included to control for baseline
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reaction time and to balance the emotional valence of stimuli.

To

control for possible categorical priming effects in the positive and
neutral items, words within these categories were semantically
related.

Thus, the distractor words comprised one of four semantic

categories:

neutral words representative of items commonly found in

a house (e.g., bucket), positive words implying wealth or riches
(e.g., diamond), negative words which are interpersonally- or
socially-threatening (e.g., divorce), and negative words related to
concerns about illness (e.g., symptoms of illnesses or names of
diseases such as cancer).
Words used for the task were drawn from a large pool of items
that were semantically related to the 4 categories described above.
All words in the pool were between 4 and 7 letters long.

So that

degree of stimulus emotionality and threat could be controlled in
forming categories, two panels of judges were asked to rate each word
in the pool.

The first 8-member panel was asked to rate each word on

how threatening it was using a 7-point Likert Scale (0 - Extremely
Threatening to 6 - Not at All Threatening).

Similarly, a different

panel of 8 judges was asked to rate each word on emotional valence
using a 7-point Likert Scale (0 - Extremely Negative to 6 - Extremely
Positive).

Words were selected for the 4 previously described

categories (neutral, positive, and the 2 negative categories) based
upon these ratings.
A complete list of the 160 distractors actually used in the
experiment is presented by category in Appendix D.

The mean word

length, frequency of usage, and judges' ratings for each category are
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Table 1 .
Word Categories by Mean Length, Frequency, and Ratings

Length
Frequency

Neutral

Illness

Social

Positive

5.30

5.60

5.58

5.63

29.35

28.40

28.80

28.63

Rating
Valence

1.48=

1.54=

3.33b

4.35a

Threat

3.33b

3.65^

5.84a

5.58a

Note. Within the valence and threat ratings, means with the same
letter are not significantly different

presented in Table 1.

An analysis of variance indicated that the

words were equated such that there were no significant differences in
word length across categories [F(3,156) = 0.87, ns]. Similarly, the
words were also equated across categories [F(3,156)=0.00, ns] on
frequency of usage in the United States based on norms provided by
Francis and Kucera (1982).

The words were also tested for

readability with Grammatik IV (Reference Software International,
1989) which revealed that the average word in the distractor list was
1.42 syllables long, indicating that most readers could understand
the vocabulary based on the criteria of syllables per word.
Analysis of variance indicated the expected pattern of
significant differences across categories for judges' ratings on
threat [F(3,156)= 175.47, p < 0.0001] and valence [F(3,156)=288.35, p
< 0.0001].

Multiple contrasts (see Table 1) revealed that the social

and illness word categories were not significantly different on
valence or threat ratings, suggesting that the judges viewed the
words comprising these categories as equally negative and
threatening.

In contrast, the words comprising neutral and positive

categories were rated as significantly different from the two
negative categories, but not from each other, on the threat ratings.
Finally, the judges rated the positive-rich word category as
significantly more positive than the neutral category, which was
rated as significantly more positive than the two negative
categories.

The words were assigned to one of two parallel forms

that presented only one-half (N=20) of the 40 possible distractors
from each of the 4 categories.

Words within categories were equated
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on mean word length, frequency, and threat and valence ratings across
parallel forms.
Task. Subjects were seated in a sound-attenuated room in front
of a color monitor controlled by a CompuAdd 286 computer programmed
with Micro Experimental Lab (MEL) software (Schneider, 1988).

The

MEL software was programmed to log the response time and response
accuracy of each response.
on the computer.

Instructions for the task were presented

Subjects were asked to respond as quickly and as

rapidly as possible on seeing the word "left" or "right", while
ignoring any other words that appeared on the screen.

The < and >

keys on the computer keyboard were used to indicate "left" and
"right" responses and were marked accordingly.

Subjects were given

instructions to press the < key with their left hand in response to
the word left and to press the > key with their right hand in
response to the word right. Practice trials with feedback on
accuracy were given prior to presentation of the experimental trials
to ensure that subjects understood task instructions.
Each trial began with the presentation of three fixation crosses
arranged in a vertical column.

Exact location of the crosses varied

slightly on each trial to discourage subjects from staring at a fixed
position on the screen.

After a display of 500 ms, the three crosses

were replaced by the target and two distractors from the same
category.

Subjects responded to the presentation of the words with a

key press, which terminated, the display.

After a 500 ms blackout,

followed by a "get ready" signal display for 500 ms, the next trial
began.

Display of target word (i.e., left or right) position was
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completely randomized.

The distractor pairs were presented in a

fixed-random order, with each distractor pair appearing four times,
twice with the target word "right" and twice with the target word
"left".

The two distractor words were also switched between the

remaining upper and lower locations for the two presentations with
each target word.

Overall, 10 distractor word pairs in each of the 4

categories were presented four times for a total of 160 trials.

Rest

breaks were presented after every 40 trials.
Procedure
Consecutive adult attenders to the Earl K. Long Medical Center
Family Practice Clinic and Walk-In Clinic were asked to volunteer for
a study designed to examine the effects of attitudes and stress on
health.

In order to test literacy and vision as a control for

performance on the attentional search task, volunteers were first
screened with the Word Attack Subtest of the Woodcock-Johnson Psychoeducational Battery (Woodcock & Johnson, 1977).

Individuals missing

any word at the 6th grade reading level or who reported that they
were having difficulty reading (e.g., because of uncorrected vision)
were excluded from the study.

Volunteers who met criteria for

inclusion in the study were asked to sign an informed consent sheet
(see Appendix E) that described the study, specified their rights as
research participants, and granted the experimenters access to
hospital medical records.
Subjects were then asked to complete the Demographic/Medical
Status Questionnaire, the Illness Attitude Scale, the CES-D, the
Weekly Stress Inventory, and the Subjective Probability
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Questionnaire.

Subjects then were randomly assigned one of the two

parallel forms for the attentional bias task.

After completing the

task, subjects proceeded to their regularly scheduled appointment
after which their personal physician completed the objective health
status physician rating form.

All subjects were paid $5.00 for

participating and debriefed after they completed the experimental
tasks.

A board-certified Family Practice physician with board-

eligibility in Psychiatry and 15 years of experience in general
medicine outpatient clinics later reviewed each subject's medical
chart and completed a second physician rating form for each subject
as a check for inter-rater reliability.

The physicians were blind to

the subjects' IAS scores, subjective risk estimates, and other
experimental data.

RESULTS
Physician Ratings
The health status ratings made by the subjects' personal
physicians at the time of their appointment and participation in the
experiment were designated Physician 1 ratings, while the ratings
resulting from the medical chart review were designated Physician 2
ratings.

Both sets of ratings ranged from 0 to 5.

Neither set of

ratings utilized the number 6 point on the scale ("patient has a
terminal illness; death is imminent"), indicating that the exclusion
criteria were successful in screening out patients with illnesses
which were immediately life-threatening.

The rating sets had

comparable averages, with a mean of 1.76 for Physician 1 ratings and
a mean of 1.84 for Physician 2 ratings.

The two rating sets were

moderately correlated (r = 0.53, p < .0001 ).

The modest discrepancy

most likely resulted from the different processes by which the two
ratings were made, one from a global impression by the patient's
private physician during an actual medical appointment, the other
from a careful review of the patient's medical chart.

The physician

ratings were averaged to reduce error variance and this combined
physician rating was used in subsequent regression analyses to
control for objective health status among subjects.

The

generalizability coefficient (Crocker & Algina, 1986) for the average
of the two ratings was .69.
Sociodemoqraphic Data
Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 2.
The sample was composed mostly of females (87.5%), while the
44
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Table 2.
Sociodeirographic Data
Variable

N

%

Age

200

Sex

200

87.5 (female)
12.5 (male)

Race

200

75.0 (black)
24.5 (white)
0.5 (other)

Marital

194

64.9 (single)
35.1 (married)

Education

199

39.2
36.2
21.6
2.5
0.5

Income

176

77.3
15.9
3.4
1.7
0.6

Minimum
21

(< 12 years)
(12 years)
(> 12 years)
(college grad
(grad school)

(< 10,000)
(10-20,000)
(20-30,000)
(30-40,000)
(40-50,000)
1 .1 (> 50,000)

Maximum
65

Mean
40.5
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remaining 12.5% were males.

Subjects ranged in age from 21 to 65

years, with a mean age of 40.5 years.

A majority of the sample was

black (75%), compared with 24.5% subjects who were white.
additional 0.5% described their race as "other".

An

Approximately 65%

of the subjects were single (either never married, divorced, or
widowed), while 35% were married.

Seventy-five percent of the

subjects reported having completed some high school or having
obtained a high school diploma.
or university hours.

An additional 21.6% had some college

Only 3% of the sample reported having an

undergraduate degree or advanced graduate/professional school
training.

Twenty-four percent of the subjects declined to indicate

their income level.

Of those subjects who responded, approximately

93% of the subjects reported income levels of $20,000 per year or
less, while 5.7% of the subjects reported yearly income between
$20,000 and $50,000.

Only 1.1% of the subjects reported income

levels above $50,000.

Although the modal subject from this sample

was female, black, poor, and relatively uneducated, the sample
reflected the demographic trends of the patient population of the
southern charity hospital where this study was conducted.
In order to examine the effects of the dichotomous demographic
variables on the dependent variable of interest, hypochondriacal
concern, three groups were formed based upon subjects' IAS scores and
physician ratings.

Subjects who obtained a combined physician rating

above 2.0 were assigned to the "SICK" group (N=82).

Among subjects

with combined physician ratings of a 2 or less, those who scored at
or below the median (i.e., 40) of the IAS were assigned to the
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"NORMAL" group (N=66); while those who scored above 40 were assigned
to the "HYPOCHONDRIACAL" group (N=52).

Possible confounds between

the demographic factors of sex, race, and marital status and the 3
groups differing on their level of objective health status and
hypochondriacal concern were then tested with chi-square analyses.
The results indicated no significant differences between the
observed and expected frequencies among the 3 groups on sex
[X^(2)=0.60, p = .74], race [X^(2)=5.39, p = .07], and marital status
2

[X (2)=2.02, p = .37].

Furthermore, age and hypochondriacal concern

were not correlated (r = -.02, ns).

Because of the restricted range

of education and income levels in the sample, the association between
hypochondriacal concern and these two demographic variables were not
tested.

In light of these findings, none of the sociodemographic

variables were included in subsequent analyses.
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Experimental Data
Descriptive statistics of the experimental variables are
presented in Table 3.

Illness Attitude Scales global mean scores

ranged from 6 to 85 with a mean of 41.33 and standard deviation of
14.8.

This mean is higher than that reported by Kellner and his

associates (1987) for groups of randomly selected family practice
patients (29.6), psychiatric patients (24.0), and employee controls
(17.5), but lower than that, reported for a group of hypochondriacal
patients who met DSM-III-R criteria for the disorder (61.7).
Correlations between the IAS and experimental variables are
reported in Tables 4 and 5.

Consistent with other findings in the

literature, the correlation between hypochondriacal concern as
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Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics of Experimental Variables

Variable

Mean

Illness Attitude Scales

41.33

Std

Minimum

Maximum

14.8

6

85

Combined Physician Ratings

1.80

1.34

0

5

Center for Epidemiological
Studies-Depression Scale
Weekly Stress Inventory
Event Scores
Weekly Stress Inventory
Impact Scores
Attentional Bias RTs
Illness
Social-Threat
Positive-Rich
Neutral
Subjective Risk Ratings
Illness
Social
Financial

19.67

11.58

0

53

28.95

18.42

0

87

92.95

83.48

0

492

1039.11
1032.21
1029.25
1021.12

290.21
293.60
281.13
281.61

608
626
622
614

2708
2897
2618
2854

-1 .00
-1 .23
-2.09

13.25
11 .54
12.29

-32
-26
-38

32
26
30
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Table 4 .
Correlation Matrix of Experimental Variables
with Attentional Bias RTs

IAS
IAS

Physician
Rating

1.00

PHY3

0.34
.0001

0.15
.0380

0.16
.0332

0.14
.0587

0.15
.0367

1.00

0.01
.8512

-0.12
.0870

0.24
.0009

0.25
.0005

0.24
.0010

0.24
.0009

1.00

0.52
.0001

0.11
.1501

0.11
.1269

0.10
.1936

0.15
.0385

1.00

0.01
.8968

-0.01
.8458

0.01
.9130

0.02
.7619

1.00

0.97
.0001

0.98
.0001

0.97
.0001

1.00

0.97
.0001

0.98
.0001

1.00

0.97
.0001

Attentional Bias RTs
Illness

Neutral

Attentional Bias RTs
ILLNESS SOCIAL POSITIVE NEUTRAL

0.42
.0001

WSI-Impact

Positive

WSI

0.13
.0751

CES-D

Social

CES-D

1.00
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Table 5 .
Correlation Matrix of Experimental Variables
with Subjective Risk Ratings

IAS

1.00

CES-D

WSI

0.13
.0751

0.42
.0001

0.34
.0001

0.20
.0044

0.10
.1629

0.18
.0100

1.00

0.01
.8512

-0.12
.0870

-0.01
.9017

-0.10
.1572

-0.09
.1956

1.00

0.52
.0001

0.13
.0685

0.09
.2141

0.03
.6924

1.00

0.01
.9232

0.12
.0797

0.07
.3254

1.00

0.49
.0001

0.50
.0001

1.00

0.59
.0001

Physician
Rating
CES-D

WSI-Impact
Subjective Risk Ratings
Health

Social

Financial

Subjective Risk Ratings
Health Social Financial

PHY3

IAS

1.00

measured by the IAS and objective health status as measured by the
combined physician ratings was not significant (r = .13, p < 0.08).
As expected, the CES-D had a larger zero-order correlation with the
IAS scores than any of the other variables [r = .42, p < .0001].
Because the correlation between the IAS and the WSI-Irnpact score (r_ =
0.33, p < 0.0001) was larger than the correlation between the IAS and
the WSI-Event score (r = 0.24, p < 0.0005), the WSI-Impact score was
used in the subsequent regression analyses predicting hypochondriacal
concern.

None of the correlations between any of the subjective risk

estimates or attentional reaction times (see Table 6) were
significant.
Analyses of Attentional Bias Reaction Times
Only the reaction times (RTs) of 188 subjects were used in the
attentional bias results.
result of hardware failure.

RTs for three subjects were lost as a
One subject, withdrew from the study

prior to completing the attentional bias task.

An additional eight

subjects had less than a 90% accuracy rate on the attentional bias
task, suggesting global inattentiveness, so their RTs were deleted
from analysis.

Given the nature of raw RT data, most researchers

employ some technique to eliminate outliers, such as the use of
median scores and trimming.

The most popular technique involves

elimination of all points beyond some criterion (Bush, Hess, and
Wolford, 1993).

Therefore, reaction times were filtered to exclude

outliers less than 100 milliseconds (as probable anticipation
errors), or more than three standard deviations above the mean for
all responses (attributed to inattentiveness).

Mean RTs were then
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Table 6 .
Correlation Matrix of Attentional Bias RTs
and Subjective Risk Ratings

Subjective Risk
Attentional Bias RTs______
Illness Social Positive Neutral Health Social
Attentional Bias
Illness
1.00
0.97
0.98
0.97
0.06
0.03
.0001
.0001
.0001
.3792
.6823
Social

Positive (Rich)

Neutral
Subjective Risk Ratings
Health

Financial

1.00

Ratines
Financ
-0.02
.7901

0.97
.0001

0.98
.0001

0.06
.4410

0.04
.6030

-0.02
.7447

1.00

0.97
.0001

0.06
.4136

0.02
.7969

-0.03
.6578

1.00

0.07
.3397

0.03
.7253

-0.02
.7363

1.00

0.49
.0001

0.50
.0001
1.00

recalculated for each condition for each subject.

The global mean

RTs for the four word categories across all subjects were in the
expected pattern (see Table 3, p. 48), with RTs fastest for the neutral
words (1021 ms) and slowest for the two negative word categories:
illness (1039 ms) and social-threat (1032 ms).

The mean RT for the

positive rich word category attained an intermediate position at 1029
ms.

The four RTs were highly correlated, ranging between .97-.98

(see Table 4, p. 49).

The combined physician ratings were moderately

correlated with all four RT word types, indicating that a general
slowing in reaction time was associated with poorer health status.
Exploratory Stepwise Regression with Attentional Bias RTs. To
test the main hypotheses concerning threat specificity in attentional
bias, the RTs for illness and social threat words were entered into
an exploratory stepwise regression, along with the CES-D and WSI
scores, to predict hypochondriacal concern as measured by the IAS
after controlling for objective health status and neutral reaction
time.

The interaction term combining CES-D and the illness RT mean

was also included among the variables to be stepped in to test the
hypothesis that an interaction between attentional bias to illness
cues and mood would significantly predict hypochondriacal concern.

A

power analysis for the above regression indicated that for 188 cases
and. seven predictor variables, the probability of detecting the
extent to which each of the IVs made a unique contribution to the
dependent variable [estimating f

at .04/(1-.35) = .062] was

approximately 70 per cent (for a = .05, L = 11.16).
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Table 7.
Summary of Variab3.es Entered in Stepwise Regression
Predicting Hypochondriacal Concern Using Mean RTs

Variable
Entered
Removed

Step

Partial

Model
RZ

F

P

Physician
Rating

0

Neutral RT

0

0.03

0.03

3.21

0.0426

CES-D

1

0.16

0.20

37.67

0.0001

WSI-Impact

2

0.03

0.23

6.55

0.0113

Social RT

3

0.01

0.24

2.75

0.0990

4

0.01

0.23

2.75

0.0990

Social RT

Note. Illness RT and the interaction term did not meet criteria
for entry into the model.
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The results of the stepwise regression are presented in Table 7.
The combined physician rating and neutral RTs were entered into the
regression, resulting in an R-square of 0.03 [F(2,185)=3.21, p <
0.05).

With the significance level for entry into the model set at

0.15, the CES-D scores stepped in first and predicted 16% incremental
variance [F(3,184)=37.67, p < 0.0001], while WSI scores entered
second and predicted 3% incremental variance [F(4,183)=6.55, p <
0.02].

Although the social threat mean RTs entered next, it was not

significant at the .05 level and was therefore deleted.

Neither the

illness RT mean or the interaction term met criterion for entry into
the model.

The overall model predicted 23% of the variance in IAS

scores [F(4,183)=13.32, p < 0.0001.
In light of the intriguing pattern of results of the stepwise
regression, a decision was made to re-analyze the data with a
trimming procedure suggested by Bush and her associates (1993).
Using Monte Carlo simulations, these investigators tested the ability
of different types of transformations to improve power in withinsubject designs employing reaction time data.

Their results clearly

indicated that trimming was more effective than eliminating all
points beyond a criterion.

The trimming technique which they used,

eliminating the highest and lowest score for each subject in each
condition, was superior to criterion elimination with both normally
distributed and skewed data.

Furthermore, this technique was not

found to increase the probability of a Type I error (Bush et al.,
1993).
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Therefore, the highest and lowest RT scores from each of the 4
word types for each subject were eliminated.

The means were

recalculated and the results are presented in Table 8.

The global

trimmed means show a slightly different pattern of results from the
original means.

Although the mean RTs for the illness words were

again the slowest (1033 ms), the social-threat RTs and positive-rich
RTs means were equivalent (1022 ms).
(1013 ms).

The neutral RTs were fastest

The trimmed RT data were entered into a stepwise

regression predicting hypochondriacal concern as described above.
The combined physician ratings and the neutral RTs were entered,
resulting in an R-square of .03 [F(2,185)=2.88, p < 0.06].

CES-D

scores stepped in first [F(3,184)-38.02, p < 0.0001] and predicted an
additional 17% of the variance, followed by WSI scores [F(4,183)=
6.53, p < 0.02] which predicted 3% of incremental variance.

The

trimmed mean RT for social words entered last [F(5,182)=6.06,
p < .02] and also predicted 3% additional variance.

Neither the

trimmed mean illness RT nor the interaction term met the 0.15
criterion level for entry into the model.

The overall model

predicted 25% of the variance in IAS scores (see Table 9).
Analyses of Subjective Risk Estimates
Descriptive statistics of the positive, negative, and total
subjective risk ratings for the future health, social, and financial
events are presented in Table 10.

Total rating scores for each

domain were created by adding the ratings (on a 0 to 8 scale) for the
5 future positive events and the 5 future negative events.
ratings for the negative events received negative signs.

The
The total
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Table 8 .
Trimmed Reaction Times for Word Categories

Mean

Std

Minimum

Maximum

Illness RT

1033 ms

304 ms

606 ms

3014 ms

Social RT

1022 ms

292 ms

623 ms

2940 ms

Positive RT

1022 ms

290 ms

621 ms

2848 ms

Neutral RT

1013 ms

295 ms

613 ms

3246 ms
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Table 9 .
Summary of Variables Entered in Stepwise Regression
Predicting Hypochondriacal Concern Using Triinmed Mean RTs

Variable
Entered

Step

Partial
R

Mocjel
F

P

Physician
Rating

0

Neutral RT

0

0.03

0.03

2.88

0.0589

CES-D

1

0.17

0.20

38.02

0.0001

WSI-Impact

2

0.03

0.22

6.53

0.0114

Social RT

3

0.03

0.25

6.06

0.0147

Note. Illness RT and interaction term did not meet criteria for
entry into the model.
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Table 10.
Mean Positive, Negative, and Total Subjective Risk Ratings
By Domain

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

STD

Health Positive

14.45

0

40

7.79

Health Negative

-15.45

0

-36

8.75

Social Positive

14.33

0

40

8.67

Social Negative

-15.56

0

-37

8.14

Financial Positive

13.31

0

36

8.09

Financial Negative

-15.40

0

-40

9.02

Health Total

-1 .00

-32

32

13.25

Social Total

-1 .23

-26

26

11.54

Financial Total

-2.09

-38

30

12.29
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ratings could therefore range from -40 to +40 with a "0" indicating
that subjects rated future negative events and future positive events
as equally likely to occur.
The total mean scores for all 3 domains were negative,
indicating that subjects in general rated future negative events as
slightly more likely to occur than positive events.

Correlations

between the total subjective risk estimates and the other
experimental variables were presented in Table 5 (see p. 50).

The

intercorrelations among subjective risk ratings ranged from .49 .59 (p < .0001).

Contrary to expectations, the correlations between

the total subjective risk scores for the 3 domains and
hypochondriacal concern were positive (illness r_ = .20, p < .01;
social r = .10, ns; financial r = .18, p = .01).

The same was true

of the correlations between the total subjective risk scores and
level of depression (illness r = .13, no; social r = .09, ns;
financial r = .03, ns.).

This indicates that subjects tended to rate

positive future events as more likely to happen than future negative
events as hypochondriacal concern and depression increased.
Exploratory Stepwise Regression with Subjective Risk Ratings.
To test the hypothesis that inflation of future negative health risk
would predict hypochondriacal concern, the relations among
hypochondriacal concern, mood, stress, and subjective risk were also
assessed with multiple regression.

Scores from the CES-D, WSI-Impact

scores, subjective risk ratings for future health and social events,
and the interaction between depression and future health risk
probabilities were used to predict hypochondriacal concern as

measured by IAS scores in an exploratory stepwise regression, after
controlling for objective health status as measured by the combined
physician ratings.

The specific purpose of the analysis was to: 1)

test the content specificity hypothesis by determining whether
increased subjective risk for negative health outcomes would predict
significantly more of the variance in hypochondriacal concern than
subjective risk estimates for negative social outcomes; and 2)
whether mood would significantly interact with subjective risk
estimates for health outcomes in predicting hypochondriacal concern.
Power for this analysis to detect the unique contribution of each
IV (200 cases, six predictor variables, L = 11.97, a = .05) was
determined to be approximately 75 per cent.
The combined physician ratings were entered (see Table 11) and
produced a Multiple R of .2 [F( 1,198)=3 -20, p < .08].

With the

significance level set at 0.15 for entry into the model, CES-D scores
stepped in first and predicted 17% incremental variance
[F(2,197)=41.97, p < 0.0001].

WSI scores stepped in second and

predicted 3% incremental variance [F(3,196)=6.72, p < 0.02].

The

subjective risk scores for future health events entered next
[F(4,195)=6.70, p < 0.02] and predicted 3% incremental variance,
while the interaction term entered last [F( 5,194)=3.90, p < 0.05] and
predicted an additional 3% in incremental variance.

The subjective

risk ratings for future social events failed to meet, criterion for
entry into the model.

The full model predicted 26% variance in IAS

scores [F(5,194)=13.40, p < 0.0001].
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Table 11.
Summary of Variables Entered in Stepwise Regression
Predicting Hypochondriacal Concern Using Subjective Risk Ratings

Variable
Entered

Step

Partial

Mo^el
F

P

Physician
Rating

0

0.02

0.02

3.20

0.0751

CES-D

1

0.17

0.19

41 .97

0.0001

WSI-inpact

2

0.03

0.22

6.72

0.0102

Ratings for Future
Health Events

3

0.03

0.24

6.70

0.0103

CES-D X Ratings
for Future Health
Events

4

0.02

0.26

3.90

0.0497

Examination of the parameter estimates revealed that the main
effect for subjective risk estimates of future health events in
predicting hypochondriacal concern was positive, similar to that of
the zero-order correlation.

This indicated that as hypochondriacal

concern increased in the sample, positive future health events were
rated as more likely to happen than negative events.

The significant

interaction term suggested that the regression of hypochondriacal
concern on predictions of future health events varied with level of
depression.

Interestingly, the parameter estimate for the

interaction term between ratings of future health events and
depression was negative.
To clarify the interaction, separate regressions were performed
for subjects differing on level of depression, based upon a median
split of the CES-D scores.

Among subjects scoring less than 17 on

the CES-D, ratings of future health events predicted 18% incremental
variance in hypochondriacal concern after controlling for objective
health status [F(2,93)=11.95, p < .001].
positive for this regression.

The parameter estimate was

Among subjects scoring 17 or higher on

the CES-D, however, the linear regression of hypochondriacal concern
on predictions of future health events was practically nonexistent.
After controlling for objective health status, predictions of future
health events accounted for less than .01 incremental variance in
hypochondriacal concern [F(2,101 )=0.11, ns] among depressed subjects.
Additional Analyses of Subjective Risk Ratings. In order to
better understand the different relations between hypochondriacal
concern and ratings of future health events among depressed and
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Table 12.
Total Mean Subjective Risk Ratings for Illness Events
of HYPO Group by CES-D

Sick

Normal

Hypochondriacal

Low CES-D

-5.31

-3.15

9.60

High CES-D

0.72

-0.90

-0.14
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nondepressed subjects, an ANOVA was performed to further analyze the
subjective risk ratings.

To do this, the 3 previously described HYPO

(normal, sick, hypochondriacal) groups created to rule out possible
confounds with sociodemographic variables were used.

The HYPO groups

were further divided by median split on their CES-D scores to compare
subjective risk ratings of future health events (see Table 12).
The analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect for HYPO
[F(2,194)=2.87, p < .02], but the main effect for DEPRESSION was not
significant [F(1,194)=0.35, ns]. The interaction term, however, was
significant [F(2,194)=5.33, p < .01].

For both normal and sick

subjects, ratings of future positive illness events were rated as
more likely among those who were depressed than those who were not.
This pattern was reversed in the hypochondriacal subjects.

Depressed

hypochondriacal subjects rated future negative events as more likely
to occur than future positive events compared to nondepressed
subjects with hypochondriacal concern.
Path Analysis
The path analysis proposed for this project was performed to
explore the direct and indirect contributions of objective health
status, minor life events, dysphoric mood, attentional bias to
illness stimuli, and subjective risk for future health events in
their hypothesized relation with hypochondriacal concern as measured
by IAS scores.

The proposed causal model is presented in the path

diagram in Figure 1.

The model tested in the path analysis was

recursive, testing the flow of causality in one direction only.

The

model was also just identified, meaning that each variable in the
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Attentional Bias

Illness Cues
102

.1 21
Objective
Health Status
.1 44 *

Hypochondriacal
Concern

-.002

.011

v061

Minor Stress

.3 0 1 *

-.0 1 8

-100

.5 2 9 *

Subjective Risk
to Future
.198 *

Health Events

Dysphoric M ood

Figure 1.
Path diagram of proposed causal model of hypochondriasis (N=188)
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Table 13.
Path Analysis of Combined Physician Ratings, Weekly Stress,
Depression, Attentional Bias to Illness, and Subjective Risk to
Future Health Events on Hypochondriacal Concern (N=188)
r

direct

indirect

Physician Ratings

.135

.144*

.005

Weekly Stress

.344*

.211*

.143*

Depression

.420*

.301*

.017

Attentional Bias

.080

.121

.002

Subjective Risk

.205*

.162*

Note. * indicates p < .05

-
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model was hypothesized to have an effect on every later endogenous
variable in the proposed path.

Each variable was therefore regressed

on all antecedent variables in the model.

To control for baseline

reaction time, linear regression was used to create a weighted
difference score of the trimmed illness reaction times by removing
its shared variance with the trimmed neutral reaction times.
Path coefficients are the estimates of the direct effect of a
variable on the variable which it is assumed to cause.

These

coefficients may be interpreted in much the same manner as
standardized beta weights in multiple regression.

The path

coefficients for the proposed causal model are presented in Figure 1.
Table 13 also presents the direct and indirect effects of objective
health status, weekly stress, depression, attentional bias to illness
stimuli, and subjective risk for future health events on
hypochondriacal concern.

Objective health status, weekly stress,

depression, and subjective risk ratings for future health events all
had significant direct effects on hypochondriacal concern, with the
direct effect of depression being the largest.

The direct effects of

attentional bias on subjective risk and hypochondriacal concern were
not significant.

Of all the variables in the model, only weekly

stress had a significant indirect effect on hypochondriacal concern.
Additional Analyses. The path analysis failed to support
attentional bias to illness stimuli as an important contributor to
hypochondriacal concern.

Although objective health status was

statistically controlled for in the path analysis, it may be that
attentional bias to illness stimuli is discontinuous across healthy
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subjects with hypochondriacal concern, and sick individuals with
legitimate reasons to be worried about their health.

In order to

assure that the relation between hypochondriacal concern and
attentional bias to illness words was not being masked by subjects
who had actually had a serious illness, an additional path analysis
was performed after deleting the data of the 78 subjects (out of the
188 subjects with reaction time data) who had combined physician
ratings greater than 2 (indicating poorer objective health status).
This left 110 relatively healthy subjects for this analysis.
The exclusion of the sick subjects reduced the range of
physician ratings and limited the causal impact of objective health
status on the subsequent variables in the model.

The path was

therefore performed again with only the weekly stress scores, the
depression scores, the weighted difference scores for the illness
attentional bias reaction times, and the subjective risk ratings for
future illness events.
identified.

As before, the model was recursive and just-

The hypothesized path model and path coefficients are

presented in Figure 2.

Table 14 presents the direct and indirect

effects of the variables in the proposed causal model.
The removal of individuals with a serious illness from the
sample produced major changes in the path coefficients of the model
such that the direct effects of weekly stress and subjective risk, as
well as the indirect effect of weekly stress, were no longer
significant.

The decline of the casual impact of subjective risk was

undoubtedly due to its previously discussed complex, nonlinear
interaction with depression and hypochondriacal concern.
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Attentional Bias

Illness Cues
1 77 *

■ 139

079

Hypochondriacal
Concern
M inor Stress.

•101

.147

.5 0 8 *

.0 4 9

Subjective Risk
to Future
Health Events

Dysphoric Mood

.125

Figure 2 .
Path diagram with non-sick subjects (N=110)
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Table 14.
Path Analysis of Weekly Stress, Depression, Attentional Bias to
Illness, and Subjective Risk to Future Health Events on
Hypochondriacal Concern in Non-Sick Subjects (N=110)

r

direct

indirect

Weekly Stress

.312*

.149

Depression

.397*

.329*

-.007

Attentional Bias

.120

.177*

.006

Subjective Risk

.170

.147

Note. * indicates p < .05

.166

-
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Interestingly, the only variables which had significant direct
effects on hypochondriacal concern were depression and attentional
bias.

Furthermore, most of the impact of depression and attentional

bias on hypochondriacal concern was direct, that is, not mediated by
any of the other measured variables.

It thus appears that the direct

effect of attentional bias on hypochondriacal concern occurred
independently of depressed mood and the other measured variables in
the sample of non-sick subjects.
This analysis, although suggestive that attentional bias to
illness cues contributes to hypochondriacal concern in individuals
who do not have a serious illness, did not resolve the issue of
whether or not the effect is more important than that of attentional
bias to socially threatening stimuli.

To test this, a final stepwise

regression was performed with the data from the 110 non-sick subjects
using CES-D scores, WSI-Impact scores, and weighted difference scores
for both the illness and social reaction times (in which their shared
variance with baseline neutral reaction time was removed) as
predictors.

The CES-D scores stepped in first and predicted

approximately 16% of the variance in IAS scores [F(1,108)=20.25, p <
.0001].

The attentional bias weighted difference score for social

reaction times stepped in and accounted for 3% incremental variance
[F(2,107 )=4.45, p < .05] - Although the WSI-Impact scores were
entered in the third step [F(3,106)=2.16, p < .15], it was later
removed from the model.

The weighted difference score for illness

reaction times did not meet the .I5 criterion for entry into the
model.

Although the second path analysis suggested that illness RTs,

when not in competition with social RTs, will predict a significant
amount of variance in hypochondriacal concern in non-sick subjects,
the social RTs continued to account for relatively more variance in
hypochondriacal concern than the illness RTs when both variables were
included in the same regression.

DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to investigate attentional bias
to illness-related stimuli, as inferred from the reaction times in
the presence of illness distractors on the attentional search task,
and inflation of subjective risk for future negative health events,
as measured probability judgments, in hypochondriacal concern.
Theory and clinical lore suggest that attentional bias to illnessrelated stimuli and increased subjective risk for future negative
health events are etiologically related to hypochondriacal concern.
The results, however, generally failed to support the hypotheses that
illness-specific cognitive distortions would predict hypochondriacal
concern in this sample of medical outpatients.
Summary of Attentional Bias Analyses
The results of the stepwise regression with the attentional bias
RTs failed to confirm the specificity hypothesis that attentional
bias to illness stimuli would predict a significant amount of
variance in hypochondriacal concern, either as a main effect or in
interaction with depressed mood.

It should not be assumed, however,

that the attentional bias task itself was insensitive with this
sample of subjects, given the findings with the socially threatening
words.

The trimming procedure apparently decreased within subject

variance in the RTs and enabled the social threat RTs to meet
criterion for entry into the model.
The failure to find attentional bias to illness cues was
surprising.

Recent research has suggested that attentional bias to

threatening stimuli is specific to an individual's clinical concerns.
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This specificity to threat has been demonstrated, for example, in
social phobics with socially-threatening words (Hope et al., 1990),
and PTSD-disordered war veterans with combat-related words (McNally
et al., 1990).

Therefore, it was hypothesized that hypochondriacal

concern would be associated with attentional bias to illness words,
as opposed to socially-threatening words.

Results of the stepwise

regression with all subjects, however, indicated that attentional
bias to socially threatening words predicted more variance in
hypochondriacal concern.

Once sick subjects were removed from the

sample, a path analysis supported the hypothesis that attentional
bias to illness cues does have a causal impact on hypochondriacal
concern.

A final stepwise regression, however, indicated that RTs to

illness words still accounted for less variance in IAS scores than
RTs to social threat words.
Failure to find a specific attentional bias to illness cues
might have been caused by a lack of subjects with DSM-III-R
hypochondriasis.

In a recently published review of attentional bias

research, Logan and Goetsch (1993) concluded that the specificity
effect tended to be found only in DSM-III-R diagnostic groups, while
analogue or subclinical groups displayed attentional bias to general
threat.

For example, in the surveyed 14 studies employing anxiety-

disordered subjects that attempted to determine whether attentional
bias was to specific or general threat cues, 1 I found attentional
bias to specific, personally relevant threat cues.

Studies with

nonclinical subjects with high trait anxiety, however, typically have
found greater attentional bias toward general than specific threats.
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While it was hoped that the fairly large sample of medical
patients would include some individuals whose hypochondriacal concern
was in the clinical range, limited resources did not permit subjects
to be diagnosed psychiatrically. Even for those subjects with high
IAS scores and low physician ratings, it cannot be assumed that they
met the criteria for the DSM-III-R diagnosis of hypochondriasis.

At

best, they can only be viewed as lying in the upper range of the
continuum of subclinical hypochondriacal concern.

The final path

analysis and stepwise regression with non-sick subjects indicated
that attentional bias to illness and social cues both contributed to
hypochondriacal concern.

This suggests that a general sensitivity to

all threatening stimuli, rather than illness cues alone, was linked
to subclinical levels of hypochondriacal concern in this sample,
consistent with the findings of the Logan and Goetsch review.
The consistent superiority of the RTs to social threat words
over RTs to illness words in predicting hypochondriacal concern,
however, remains puzzling.

The intriguing findings might indicate

that social distress plays a contributing role in abnormal illness
concerns, consistent with speculations that hypochondriacs express
emotional problems in somatic terms.

Such conjectures, however, are

purely post hoc and tempered by the fact that the social threat RTs
only accounted for 3% of the variance in IAS scores.

A more

parsimonious explanation is that subjects with extremely high levels
of hypochondriacal concern also had significant social concerns.
The sociodemographics of the sample suggest that the study
participants faced enormous social and economic stressors.

Research
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indicates that psychopathology is prevalent among patients attending
low-income, inner-city medical clinics (e.g., Miranda & Dwyer, 1993).
As many as 65% of the medical outpatients at the hospital where this
study was conducted, for example, meet criteria for at least one DSMIII-R diagnosis (Adams, 1993).

Indeed, the average CES-D scores

(19.67) and WSI scores (Event - 29.95, Impact - 92.95) of the present
sample indicates moderate to severe levels of depression and stress.
It is conceivable that the ability of the social threat RTs to
predict hypochondriacal concern may have resulted from comorbid
anxiety or depression related to social distress.
Another possible explanation for the failure to find illnessspecific cognitive distortions is that the hospital environment used
to locate subjects may have unintentionally biased the results.
Given that the subjects were tested in a medical setting while
awaiting a medical appointment, it may be that the experimental
conditions primed illness concepts among all subjects, thus erasing
any pre-existing differential sensitivity to illness cues that might
have existed among them.

It seems reasonable to propose that

different results may have been obtained in a neutral setting.
Therefore, the present failure to find evidence of a specific
attentional bias to illness cues must be regarded as inconclusive.
Summary of Subjective Risk Analyses
Although the subjective risk estimates for future health events
and its interaction with depression in predicting hypochondriacal
concern were significant, together they only accounted for a modest
6% of the variance in hypochondriacal concern.

Furthermore, the
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regression was in the opposite direction from that which was
hypothesized in that subjects apparently rated future positive health
events as more likely to occur than future negative health events as
their level of hypochondriacal concern increased.

The significance

of the interaction term, however, suggested that an important
conditional relation existed in the data.

When groups differing in

level of depression were compared, the trend for positive health
events to be rated as more likely to occur than negative health
events as hypochondriacal concern increased was only found among
nondepressed subjects.

Subjective risk scores for future health

events did not predict any appreciable amount of variance among
subjects who were depressed.
The originally proposed stepwise regression failed to support
the hypotheses that hypochondriacal concern would be associated with
an inflation of perceived risk for future negative health events, and
that the relation would be magnified among depressed individuals.

It

appears, however, that the use of linear regression analysis obscured
the complex interactions among subjects with extreme levels of
hypochondriacal concern.

Depressed mood did apparently interact in a

unique way with abnormal illness concerns when individuals scoring in
the upper ranges of hypochondriacal concern contemplated the future.
An unplanned, post hoc ANOVA indicated that hypochondriacal subjects
did rate future negative health events as relatively more likely to
occur when depressed, but sick and normal subjects who were depressed
rated future positive health events as more likely to occur.
opposing trends were cancelled out in the regression.

The

This suggests
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that different results may be obtained in future investigations
employing extreme groups.

As in studies of attentional bias, all

previously documented investigations of subjective risk have examined
mean differences between groups (either between extreme scorers or
between clinical patients and normals).

It may be that the proposed

cognitive biases of hypochondriasis involve qualitative differences,
rather than quantitative differences which occur on a continuum.
The finding that positive health events were rated as more
likely to occur as levels of hypochondriacal concern increased among
the sample was unexpected and suggests the operation of an
additional, unknown moderator variable.

For example, the optimism of

these subjects might reflect a defensive reporting bias resulting
from social desirability.

The complex interaction between depression

and hypochondriacal concern in subjects' ratings of future health
events also may have been due to a related, but somewhat different
variable.

Research (e.g., Davis & Schwartz, 1987) suggests that

"repressors" (i.e., low anxious/high social desirability) inhibit the
expression of negative emotional experiences because of an
inaccessibility of affective memories.

If availability does play a

role in subjective risk, then repression may inhibit probability
judgments of future negative events.

Speculation such as this, of

course, needs to be pursued in further research.
The failure to find support for the proposed attentional and
subjective risk biases may also be attributed to the sociodemographic
characteristics of the subjects.

The sample for the present study

was apparently very different in terms of their sociodemographic
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make-up from the samples of college students and clinic patients
which have been used in most previous studies of cognitive
distortions.

Although the present results might be dismissed as

coming from an unrepresentative sample of medical patients in the
United States, studies which employ low SES and minority populations
are under-represented in the scientific literature.

Further

investigations of will be needed to determine whether the proposed
cognitive biases of hypochondriasis are generalizable to minority and
low-income samples.
It is entirely possible, for example, that the casual path to
hypochondriacal concern might be very different among the
economically and educationally deprived patients who participated in
this study.

Subclinical levels of hypochondriacal concern might be

reinforced in low SES patients if medical settings offer a
sympathetic forum for expressing and obtaining assistance for social
and financial problems.

Indeed, previous studies which have

questioned the validity of hypochondriasis as a discrete diagnostic
entity may have included a majority of subjects with comorbid
depression or anxiety related to socioeconomic problems.

Individuals

such as these may be more likely to exhibit cognitive biases to
social, or generally threatening stimuli.

In contrast, DSM-III-R

diagnosed hypochondriacs, who exhibit the classic features of
irrational beliefs about illness, disease phobia, reassurance
seeking, and doctor-shopping, may be more likely to exhibit illnessspecific cognitive distortions.
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Illness-specific cognitive distortions have been proposed to be
etiologically related to hypochondriacal concern.

Even if

attentional bias to illness cues and inflation of subjective risk for
future negative health events are eventually identified in DSM-III-R
diagnosed hypochondriacs, the question of whether they are a cause or
result of the disorder will remain.

Given the results of the Logan

and Goetsch review (1993), it may be that attentional bias to general
threatening stimuli acts as a predisposing factor for hypochondriasis
and the various anxiety disorders, but that threat-specific cognitive
distortions develop as a result of psychopathology.

It may take

longitudinal research with subjects at risk for hypochondriasis to
resolve this issue definitively.

Regardless of how the cognitive

biases may arise, however, it seems likely that they would operate as
important maintaining factors through a circular relationship.
This project involved the first attempt to establish empirical
evidence of a relationship between attentional bias and subjective
risk.

As noted previously, availability mediated by an association

network has been postulated as an underlying mechanism for both
selective allocation of attentional resources and judgments of
subjective risk (e.g., Bower, 1981).

The availability heuristic

refers to the ease with which examples of events can be remembered or
imagined.

It was assumed that if attention is repeatedly drawn to

information relevant to illness, then the availability of that
information in memory will be enhanced, and the perceived risk of
becoming ill will be increased.

The results, however, failed to

demonstrate an association between attentional bias to threatening
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stimuli and judgments of subjective risk.

This suggests that the two

cognitive biases may operate independently of each other.
The lack of association also calls into question the concept of
availability as an underlying factor for both attentional bias and
subjective risk.

McNally and his associates (1990) have proposed

that availability is an insufficient explanation for attentional
bias.

They suggest that anxiety-disordered patients may instead have

more difficulty deactivating threat concepts once they have been
accessed.

MacLeod and Mathews (1991) have also recently questioned

the idea that availability is the important mediating factor for
attentional bias and suggest that the phenomenon might be better
explained by the differential assignment in the priority assigned to
the processing of simultaneously available stimulus inputs.
Although the present study failed to support the hypothesis that
individuals with hypochondriacal concern have specific cognitive
biases toward illness cues, further investigations of attentional
bias and subjective risk in hypochondriacal concern appear warranted.
Future research, however, should employ subjects who explicitly meet
the criteria for the DSM-III-R diagnosis of hypochondriasis compared
to normals as well as individuals with subclinical levels of
hypochondriacal concern.

The magnitude of subjects' social concerns

should be assessed and matched across groups so that any differential
responses to social threat cues on information processing tasks can
be placed in perspective.

Perhaps most importantly, subjects should

be tested in a neutral setting so that specific fears are not
differentially activated.
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Although cognitive theories of psychopathology have become very
popular in the past decade, many have employed "lay" concepts of
cognition (Teasdale, 1993).

For example, if information processing

concepts such as schemas and attentional bias are used to explain
psychopathology, it is important to determine whether the proposed
concepts represent the same phenomena as those studied by basic
cognitive science.

Otherwise, the theoretical integrity of cognitive

clinical psychology could be compromised.

By testing the

hypothesized cognitive distortions with empirical methods derived
from basic cognitive science, we can discover whether cognitive
theories of psychopathology are valid or serve merely as "post hoc
rationalizations when ad hoc clinical procedures seem to have worked"
(Ross, 1991 cf Teasdale, 1993).
Paradigms borrowed from basic cognitive science may also yield
benefits for clinical practice.

The information processing tasks

themselves may represent the crude beginnings of useful diagnostic
techniques.

In the near future, they may take their place alongside

patient self-report, behavioral observation, and psychophysiological
recordings in the multi-modal assessment of certain psychological
disorders.

Cognitive psychologists are also investigating strategies

to debias specific cognitive distortions such as unrealistic
subjective risk estimates in normals (e.g., Arkes, 1991).

These may

ultimately prove to be useful therapeutic strategies for
psychologically-disordered patients.

As cognitive factors are

increasingly recognized as important factors in psychopathology,
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research derived from basic cognitive science may help to advance the
understanding and treatment of psychological disorders.
Conclusions
The present study of cognitive distortions among medical
outpatients failed to provide support for theories which suggest
that attentional bias to illness cues and inflation of subjective
risk for future negative health events are associated with
hypochondriacal concern.

Several factors which may have contributed

to the negative findings, such as a lack of subjects clearly meeting
criteria for the DSM-III-R diagnosis for hypochondriais, were
identified.

Because the cognitive distortions appeared to operate

across subjects in a discontinuous, nonlinear fashion, future
analyses of the present data set employing statistical techniques
such as analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) or repeated measures multiple
analysis of variance (MANOVA), and discriminant function analysis may
yet reveal useful information.

Further research, however,

investigating illness-specific cognitive distortions with information
processing paradigms conparing DSM-III-R diagnosed hypochondriacs to
individuals with subclinical levels of hypochondriacal concern and
normals, appears warranted.
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DEMOGRAPHIC AND MEDICAL STATUS QUESTIONNAIRE
Age__________
Sex: M
Race: Black

F
White

Marital Status: Single

Other
Married____

Highest Level of Education Completed:

Annual Income of Household:

some high school
high school graduate
some college/university
college/university graduate
graduate/professional school

70,000+
60,000 - 70,000
50,000 - 60,000
40,000 - 50,000
30,000 - 40,000
20,000 - 30,000
10,000 - 20,000
10,000 or less

How long have you been a patient at this clinic?
What is the reason for your appointment today? (check one)
Problem with a long-standing illness (e.g., diabetes)
Problem with a recent illness (e.g., flu)
Routine Health Maintenance (e.g., physical exams for employment,
immunizations, contraception, routine pap smears, pregnancy
tests)
Has a physician ever diagnosed you with a really serious illness that
could threaten your life?

no

yes

If yes, please explain________________ ________________________

APPENDIX B
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PHYSICIAN RATING SCALE

Physician:______________________

SubjectNumber:__________
EKL#:_______________

What was the reason for this patient's clinic visit today?
______ Chronic Diagnostic Problem (e.g., Hypertension, Asthma)
______ Acute Diagnostic Problem (e.g., Urinary Tract Infection)
______ Undiagnosed Complaint or Symptom (e.g., Back Pain)
______ Routine Health Maintenance (e.g., physical exams for
employment, immunizations, contraception, routine pap smears,
pregnancy tests)
Please rate the patient's global health status using the following
scale by circling the number which best describes the patient's
overall physical health FOR THE PAST 12 MONTHS:
0 - patient is in good physicalhealth with a history of only
routine minor illnesses
1 - patient is largely free of serious medical problems but presents
with numerous undiagnosed symptoms and complaints
2 - patient is largely free of serious medical problems but has one
or more risk factors (e.g., smoking) which places him/her at
risk for the development of future illness
3 - patient hasa history of serious disease which is currently in
remission - patient appears in good health and is compliant with
medical recommendations
OR
patient has a chronic-degenerative disease (e.g., diabetes)
which is well-controlled and patient is compliant with medical
recommendations
4 - patient hasa history of serious disease which is currently in
remission - but patient is noncompliant, engages in health risk
behaviors, or has additional aggravating illnesses
5 - patient currently has one or more chronic-degenerative
disease(s) which is poorly controlled resulting in an increased
probability of morbidity
6 - patient has a terminal illness; death is imminent

APPENDIX C
SUBJECTIVE RISK QUESTIONNAIRE
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SUBJECTIVE RISK QUESTIONNAIRE
Below are a number of events which could possibly occur
to you sometime in the future. For each event, please estimate the
likelihood that the situation could occur to you by using the scale
at the top of each page to rate the event on a scale from 0 to 8.
Record your response by placing a number in the blank next to the
item. This number should reflect your opinion on how likely you
believe the event will happen to you. Before answering any question,
please review the scale.
DIRECTTONS:

0

1

Almost
Impossible

2

3

A Little
Likely

4

5

Moderately
Likely

6

7

Very
Likely

8
Almost
Certain

1. What is the probability that you will be happily married in
______
5 years?
2. What is the probability that you will be short on cash
and be unable to pay one of your electricity bills on time
next year?
3. What is the probability that you will be physically active
in 20 years?
4. What is the probability that you will be lonely in your
old age?
5. What is the probability that someone will give you money
for your birthday next year?
6. What is the probability that you wall die of a heart
attack?
7. What is the probability that you will make any new friends
this year?
8. What is the probability that you will lose your wallet in
the next 20 years?
9. What is the probability that you will feel in peak physical
condition this year?
10. What is the probability that you will not be on speaking
terms with a member of your family in the next ten years?
11. What is the probability that you will win the Louisiana
lottery in the next five years?

12. What is the probability that you will develop pneumonia in
the next five years?
13. What is the probability that you will be praised in the
newspaper in the next 20 years?
14. What is the probability that the IRS will audit your
income tax returns in your lifetime?
15. What is the probability that your doctor will give you a
clean bill of health in 15 years?
16. What is the probability that you will be rejected by your
best friend next year?
17. What is the probability that your income will increase in
the next 5 years?
18. What is the probability that you will ever contract AIDS?
19. What is the probability your friends and family will value
your opinion and seek your advice in 20 years?
20. What is the probability that you will be successfully sued
in the next 10 years?
21. What is the probability that you will live to be 100?
22. What is the probability that you will be divorced in 20
years?
23. What is the probability that you will ever find $100 on
the street?
24. What is the probability that you will have to cut back
on activities in the next five years because of poor health?
25. What is the probability that you will receive a "citizen
of the month" award sometime in your life?
26. What is the probability that you will have to file for
bankruptcy in the next 20 years?
27. What is the probability that you would not become sick
if you were exposed to the flu next year?
28. What is the probability that a friend will criticize
you in the next 5 years?

29. What is the probability that you will be debt-free in
15 years?
30. What is the probability that you will develop cancer
within the next 20 years?
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DISTRACTOR WORDS USED FOR ATTENTIONAL BIAS TASK BY CATEGORY

HIMSS

SOCIAL

AIDS
CARDIAC
COMA
RASH
ALLERGY
NAUSEA
VOMIT
SNEEZE
SPASM
GERM
CRAMP
INFECT
DIZZY
ULCER
SEIZURE
SURGERY
ITCH
COUGH
DEAF
CRIPPLE
SORE
VIRUS
ACHE
BLEED
POISON
FEVER
CHOKE
ILLNESS
CANCER
FAINT
TUMOR
STROKE
INJURY
HURT
SICK
BLIND
DISEASE
PAIN
OPERATE
DEATH

LOSER
IDIOT
JEALOUS
COWARD
SNEER
TIMID
CLUMSY
DISGUST
DECEIVE
OFFEND
TEASE
ANNOY
ENVY
INSULT
PUNISH
MOCK
FOOLISH
GOSSIP
RUMOR
ASHAMED
UGLY
FROWN
STUPID
LONELY
GUILTY
ABUSE
DISLIKE
BORED
CURSE
DIVORCE
BLAME
ACCUSE
ANGRY
AFRAID
IGNORE
HATE
ARGUE
FIRED
AVOID
FAILURE

NEUTRAL

HANGER
QUILT
BROOM
SKILLET
BATHTUB
NAPKIN
SPOON
OVEN
CHIMNEY
HAMMER
SPONGE
BUCKET
PILLOW
STEREO
DRAWER
ATTIC
TOWEL
STOVE
BASKET
CLOSET
CARPET
SHELF
CURTAIN
CABINET
LAMP
FORK
CLOCK
MIRROR
DISHES
PENCIL
BLANKET
BENCH
PLATE
CAMERA
STAIR
PHONE
ROOF
DESK
CHAIR
WINDOW

POSITIVE

JACKPOT
CAVIAR
LOTTERY
RUBY
TUXEDO
CASINO
JEWEL
VELVET
LIMO
MINK
SATIN
FEAST
CRUISE
BANQUET
EMERALD
PEARL
YACHT
LACE
CASTLE
MANSION
PERFUME
SILK
DIAMOND
FURS
IVORY
RESORT
INHERIT
WEALTH
LUXURY
LEATHER
FORTUNE
SILVER
CRYSTAL
CASH
GOLD
ESTATE
RICH
BANK
DOLLARS
MONEY
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CONSENT FORM
PERFORMANCE SITES: Subjects for this study will be obtained from the
Family Practice Clinic at the Louisiana State University Medical
Center in Baton Rouge at Earl K. Long Medical Center.
For 24-hour access, please contact 358-1105
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:
A. This project is a research study.
B. Individuals who agree to participate as research subjects in this
project will not be treated in any way that is different from other
patients at this clinic, other than completing the questionnaires and
experimental task described below (see #7). Participation in this
project as a research subject will not in any way affect or otherwise
alter medical care received at this clinic.
C. This study is designed to investigate how health status,
attitudes toward health, mood, and stress influence thinking and use
of health care resources in family practice patients.
SUBJECT INCLUSION CRITERIA: Individuals are eligible to participate
in the study if they are: between 21 and 65 years of age and if they
have been patients at the Family Practice Clinic for at least one
year.
SUBJECT EXCLUSION CRITERIA: Individuals will not be eligible to
participate in the study if they currently have a terminal illness
(e.g., cancer). Individuals will also be excluded from participation
if they are unable to read for any reason (e.g., illiterate or
because of poor eyesight or because reading glasses were left at
home). Individuals may participate only once in this project.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY: Volunteers will be recruited from patients
visiting the Family Practice Clinic. Subjects will complete the
study while waiting for their regularly scheduled clinic
appointments. After giving informed consent, eligible subjects will
be asked to conplete a packet containing a demographic questionnaire
and measures of: attitudes toward health, health status, daily
stress, mood, and estimates of future events. In addition, each
subject's Family Practice physician, and another physician who will
review each subject's medical chart, will provide the experimenter
with health status ratings. Information will also be obtained about
the frequency of clinic attendance. Neither physician, however, will
have knowledge of the subjects' questionnaire responses.
After completing the questionnaires, each subject will be asked to
participate in a computer task assessing the extent to which
attention is captured by certain topics. Subjects should be able to
conplete the study in approximately 45 minutes. About 200 patients
will participate in the study.
BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS: Potential benefits which may result from this
research include: information leading to better understanding of
factors related to the use of health care resources and improved
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methods for helping patients learn to cope with these factors.
Subjects actually participating in the study, however, will receive
no direct benefits.
RISKS TO SUBJECTS: There are no known major physical, psychological,
and/or social risks or discomforts that might occur to subjects as a
result of this study. Participation in this study, however, may
involve unforseen risks. Lesser risks can be explained if subjects
ask for this information. If subjects wish, the experimenter can
provide a referral for additional assistance. Patients should not
expect their medical condition to improve with participation in this
study.
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY: Participation is
voluntary. Patients who do not participate will attend their clinic
appointments as usual.
SUBJECT REMOVAL: There are no forseeable circumstances under which
eligible subjects would be removed from the study against their
wishes. Subjects will be forced to withdraw only if they become
physically unable (e.g., due to sudden illness) to complete the
experimental tasks described above.
SUBJECTS' RIGHT TO REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE OR WITHDRAW: Study subjects
may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time
without jeopardizing, in any way, their medical treatment at this
institution in the present or future. Should significant new
findings develop during the course of the research which may relate
to the subject's willingness to continue participation, that
information will be provided to the subject.
SUBJECTS' RIGHT TO PRIVACY: The results of the study may be released
to the funding agency. The results of the study may also be
published. The privacy of subjects, however, will be protected and
they will not be identified in any way.
RELEASE OF INFORMATION: The medical records related to the study are
available to the sponsoring agency. By agreeing to participate in
this research study and by signing this consent form, the subject a.)
gives permission for his/her Family Practice physician to release
health status ratings to the experimenter, and b.) gives permission
for another physician to review the subject's medical chart and
provide similar information on health status and frequency of clinic
visits to the experimenter.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION:
A. Participation in this study will not result in any extra charges
above and beyond those routinely incurred by patients with similar
illnesses.
B. The costs of study-related and unforeseen complications must be
met by subjects.
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C. Subjects who conplete the study will be paid $5.00 for their
participation. If subjects choose to withdraw from the study
prematurely, they will be partially compensated with an amount based
upon percent of time completed, not to exceed $2.00.
SIGNATURES: The study has been discussed with me and all my
questions have been answered. I agree with the terms above
and acknowledge that I have been given a copy of the consent form.

Signature of Subject

Date

Signature of Witness

Date
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